Chinese scholars and officials have developed a detailed 12-point plan outlining Beijing’s approach to governing Taiwan in the event of what they term “compelled reunification.” The plan, formulated by mainland Chinese and Hong Kong academics, envisions a transition period marked by military control, ideological re-education, and sweeping political reforms, aiming to integrate Taiwan under Communist Party rule.

According to the plan, Taiwan would undergo a “quasi-military governance” period lasting three to five years during which Chinese troops would be stationed on the island, and Taiwan’s armed forces would be disbanded, with their equipment handed over to Beijing. The island’s government would be reorganized into six districts, and all legal and administrative systems would be “de-nationalized and de-centralized” to complete a process the authors call “localization.” Education reforms would prioritise patriotism and “deanti-communist education,” mirroring measures already imposed in Hong Kong.

This strategy draws heavily from the “one country, two systems” framework currently applied in Hong Kong and Macau. The architects of the plan argue that these models provide a reference for Taiwan, including “patriotic governance” and tight controls on political dissent. Under Hong Kong’s national security law, for example, cases relating to secessionist or subversive activities are tried by judges appointed by the territory’s Beijing-backed leadership, with limited rights to bail and severe penalties extending to “thought crimes.” The plan envisages prosecuting those labeled as part of the “radical Taiwan independence movement,” individuals who oppose unification, and those accused of colluding with foreign forces.

Senior Chinese diplomat Lu Shaye has underscored the need for “re-education” in Taiwan to eradicate separatist ideas, mirroring practices adopted in Hong Kong where students are required to visit exhibitions promoting the Communist Party’s authority and highlighting external espionage threats.

The 12-point program further proposes drafting a new “mini-constitution” or basic law for Taiwan, paralleling Hong Kong’s legal framework, with final approval by China’s National People’s Congress. This would codify Beijing’s authority and subsume Taiwan’s sovereignty under the central government.

However, public opinion in Taiwan strongly opposes unification under Beijing’s terms. A recent Pew survey found that 67 percent of Taiwan’s 23 million residents primarily identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, while an August poll indicated that 81 percent reject the “one country, two systems” model.

Experts note that while the plan does not specify a timeline for reunification, it signals a shift toward concrete policy frameworks for potentially achieving Beijing’s longstanding objective of integrating Taiwan. Deng Yuwen, a former editor at the CCP’s Central Party School who now researches abroad, describes the approach as part of a broader evolution in Beijing’s Taiwan strategy, reflecting an increased emphasis on pathways and contingency planning.

Wang Jianmin, a prominent Taiwan scholar involved in developing the plan, has criticized members of Taiwan’s Kuomintang opposition for reportedly prioritizing peace without unification. Wang contends that rejecting the possibility of unification by force represents abandoning China’s long-held aspirations for sovereignty over Taiwan.

Observers highlight the regional implications of the plan, noting Taiwan’s strategic role in global trade, technology, democracy, and security. Analysts warn that any move to impose this framework could have significant consequences for Indo-Pacific stability and countries such as Australia, which maintain close economic and security ties with Taiwan.