Six months after the onset of the conflict between Israel and Iran, the situation remains unresolved with neither full-scale war nor peace established. The strait of Hormuz remains closed, a naval blockade is in place, and diplomatic negotiations continue sporadically without substantive progress. Tehran has insisted on reparations before reopening the strategic waterway, while Washington has called for compensation addressing grievances accumulated over several decades. Amid these complex talks, questions of legal accountability have become entangled with the diplomatic process.

A recent study conducted by researchers at the Kohelet Policy Forum highlights that accountability for the actions of the Iranian government and its proxy groups should be pursued through legal avenues rather than diplomatic bargaining. The study, titled "The Tehran Docket," identifies 23 potential legal strategies aimed at holding Tehran responsible for its role in regional violence and human rights abuses.

Since 1979, Iran has maintained a level of plausible deniability by supporting proxy organizations such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and various militias across the Middle East while denying direct responsibility for their attacks. International law traditionally requires proof that a state exercises “effective control” over a specific attack for it to be held directly liable. This standard was established by the International Court of Justice in the 1986 Nicaragua case, making it challenging to attribute proxy actions directly to Tehran in court.

However, the Kohelet study argues that Iran’s role in funding, arming, training, and hosting these groups on its territory transcends this hurdle. The presence of proxy infrastructure within Iran constitutes a violation of norms prohibiting states from allowing their land to be used to launch attacks against others. Moreover, Iran’s direct involvement includes multiple ballistic missile attacks on Israeli territory in 2024 and 2025, targeted assassination plots in Europe, and executions of suspected spies, acts which may qualify as war crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

Legal accountability does not depend on changes in Iranian leadership. Following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026, his successor has inherited not only power but also the state's ongoing legal responsibility for past and current actions.

Various judicial bodies offer diverse paths for recourse. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention can address cases such as that of Ahmadreza Djalali, an Iranian prisoner on death row since 2017, with decisions rendered within one year typically. Additionally, national courts in countries including Germany and Argentina have applied universal jurisdiction to prosecute Iranian officials. Sweden’s 2022 life sentence of Hamid Nouri, followed by his release in a prisoner exchange, illustrates both the potential and risks involved in these efforts.

Civil litigation in American courts has yielded significant rulings, awarding damages against Iran for attacks including the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing and the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina. The U.S. Supreme Court has supported measures to collect compensation directly from Iranian government assets. The International Court of Justice also remains an option, as Iran has not exempted itself from suits under the Genocide Convention, and precedents such as the 2020 Myanmar case demonstrate its potential relevance.

Critics point to perceived bias against Israel in international forums like the UN Human Rights Council, where Israel is uniquely subjected to a permanent agenda item. Proponents of legal action argue that this bias does not negate the utility of these institutions; rather, presenting clear, evidence-based cases against Iran could compel these bodies to uphold their own standards and deliver accountability. Conversely, a reluctance or refusal to do so would further entrench perceptions of bias.

As diplomatic negotiations continue amid the fragile status quo, proponents stress the urgency of pursuing legal action now, while evidence remains current and before political settlements risk undermining the pursuit of justice. The legal framework and mechanisms to hold Iran accountable exist, but the political will to activate them remains the critical missing element.