The Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime passage spanning just 39 kilometers at its narrowest point, remains a focal point of international tension due to recent disruptions affecting global energy supplies. Responsible for carrying about one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil, the strait has become increasingly hazardous as merchant vessels face attacks, illegal tolls, and the looming threat of naval conflict. In response, a draft United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution has been introduced with the intent of restoring safe navigation through the strait.

The draft, advanced by Bahrain on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and supported by the United States, is crafted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows for binding measures to address threats to peace. Unlike previous proposals, this text is narrowly focused on operational mechanisms to secure maritime safety without escalating tensions. However, the resolution’s progress is stalled by anticipated vetoes from Russia and China, both permanent UNSC members who have criticized the measure as biased and unbalanced, arguing that it overlooks the underlying causes of the conflict.

Russia and China’s positions appear rooted in broader geopolitical calculations. Russia views Iran as a strategic proxy diverting U.S. attention, while China benefits from discounted oil supplies and seeks to protect maritime precedents that could affect its own territorial interests. Both have consistently used their veto power to block similar initiatives, complicating efforts to achieve consensus on maintaining open sea lanes in the Gulf.

Proponents of the resolution argue that a more balanced approach could overcome this deadlock. They suggest refining the resolution’s language to provide a comprehensive account of the situation, including the initial attacks, the strait’s partial closure, and Iran’s mining and tolling activities. Incorporating a general denunciation of all threats to navigation and emphasizing comprehensive de-escalation could offer diplomatic cover acceptable to Russia and China.

Additionally, the proposal recommends elevating the reference to the Pakistan-mediated ceasefire into a clear call for its extension and transformation into a wider political settlement. This would echo broader Gulf security frameworks previously supported by Moscow and Beijing and provide these powers with a tangible stake in the diplomatic process. The resolution also calls for the establishment of an international contact group, mandated within 30 days by the UN secretary-general, to oversee mine clearance and humanitarian corridors. Importantly, this group would include all permanent UNSC members equally, encouraging shared operational responsibility.

While maintaining the resolution’s binding character to ensure enforceable action, the draft also envisions a review mechanism linked to ongoing diplomatic progress and UN oversight. Bahrain, which held the UNSC presidency in April, is positioned to facilitate these adjustments aimed at overcoming the current impasse.

Observers note that failure to achieve a council-backed resolution may lead to fragmented, unilateral responses that could undermine the UN’s authority in managing the crisis. The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz and the conflicting interests of major powers frame this issue as a test of diplomacy in an era of multipolar rivalry. Advocates of the draft resolution argue that by integrating Russia and China into the enforcement framework rather than excluding them, the UNSC could set a precedent for cooperation that balances great power competition with collective security—a model reminiscent of the 19th-century European balance of power arrangements. Such an outcome would not only enhance Gulf maritime security but also reaffirm the role of diplomacy in resolving complex international challenges.