A new AI front for the Global South

By the Editorial Team · Thursday, October 1, 2026

The World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) was founded in Shanghai by 29 countries to promote collaboration on AI governance and capacity-building, particularly targeting emerging economies in the Global South. This initiative, led by China, seeks to provide an alternative to Western-dominated AI alliances by offering practical support and resources, but its success will depend on effective implementation and broader digital reforms within member states.

In July 2026, the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) was established in Shanghai with 29 founding member countries, including Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The group aims to foster international collaboration on AI governance, capacity-building, and technology access, particularly focusing on emerging economies and developing nations commonly referred to as the Global South. WAICO’s creation marks a significant shift in the global AI governance landscape, with China playing a leading role in shaping cooperation frameworks.

Experts view WAICO as an initiative designed to offer an alternative model to the existing, predominantly Western-led AI alliances. Boris Babic, associate professor at the University of Hong Kong, highlights WAICO’s emphasis on “safety and responsibility regimes,” positioning it as a platform advocating for accessible, accountable AI development in emerging and middle-income countries, including those in Southeast Asia. This contrasts with the more geopolitically charged approach seen in the U.S.-led partnerships like the so-called “Pax Silica.”

Brian Wong, assistant professor at the University of Hong Kong and founding director of the Hong Kong Global AI Governance Hub, describes WAICO as China’s response to a fragmented global AI environment. According to Wong, the organization serves as an institutional embodiment of China’s vision for a more inclusive and open AI governance system. He notes that WAICO could appeal to nations seeking to develop AI capabilities but lacking the computing resources, capital, or research infrastructure to compete with AI frontrunners. The organization’s offerings—such as training programs, technical assistance, infrastructure support, and access to Chinese AI models—may support states focused on practical AI applications in sectors like manufacturing, logistics, public services, education, and healthcare.

The potential benefits of WAICO extend beyond governance to fostering broader commercial and political ties, as Chinese firms stand to gain influence by promoting open-weight AI models in markets that cannot afford the most advanced American systems. This approach may help China grow its cloud computing market share and expand AI exports.

However, observers caution that WAICO’s success is not guaranteed. Wallace S. Cheng, executive-in-residence fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, underscores that member countries must align AI cooperation initiatives with their national digital development strategies to realize tangible gains. Sector-specific collaborations—for example, in healthcare, agriculture, or education—and joint research centers could deliver practical benefits. Cheng stresses that WAICO should be seen as a catalyst rather than a substitute for broader domestic digital reforms, which require investments in connectivity, cloud infrastructure, and talent development.

The competition between WAICO and rival frameworks, including those led by the United States, raises concerns about intensified geopolitical rivalries that could compel countries to make strategic binary choices. Middle powers, Cheng suggests, may play a critical role in bridging divides between these competing initiatives.

Ultimately, WAICO’s impact will depend on its ability to move beyond rhetoric toward substantive implementation. Key indicators to watch in the coming years include whether membership expands beyond China’s established diplomatic network, whether promised training and cooperation centers materialize, if Chinese financing contributes to real AI infrastructure projects, and whether WAICO gains influence within United Nations-affiliated processes. Success in these areas would demonstrate whether the organization can deliver on its promise to support inclusive AI development across the Global South.

This article was reported by synthesizing coverage from multiple independent news outlets to present a balanced, unbiased account. Read about our editorial standards. Spotted an error? Let us know.