President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have reached a preliminary agreement to allow Saudi Arabia to develop a civilian nuclear power program, marking the latest chapter in years of negotiations involving both the Trump and Biden administrations. While specific details of the pact remain undisclosed, it has raised significant scrutiny amid ongoing regional security concerns.

Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to expand its nuclear energy capabilities align with Crown Prince Mohammed’s Vision 2030 plan, an extensive economic and cultural reform initiative aimed at diversifying the kingdom’s economy and reducing domestic oil consumption. By shifting to nuclear power, Saudi Arabia intends to free more crude oil for export while meeting the energy demands of a growing economy.

The United States, competing with other global powers such as China and Russia, has sought to lead Saudi Arabia’s nuclear development, which is subject to U.S. legal requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. These stipulate stringent safeguards for sharing nuclear technology to prevent proliferation.

A key point of contention centers on Saudi Arabia’s refusal to relinquish the right to enrich uranium domestically. Unlike the 2009 agreement with the United Arab Emirates—which strictly prohibited uranium enrichment and reprocessing within the UAE—Saudi officials appear to be seeking a two-year period to assess the feasibility and necessity of uranium enrichment on their territory. Experts highlight that while uranium for civilian power generation is typically enriched to about 3%, higher enrichment levels could be risk indicators for nuclear weapons development, which remains a major concern given regional tensions.

Additional worries stem from the kingdom’s stance on inspections. Unlike the UAE, which allows oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Saudi Arabia reportedly intends to limit inspections to U.S. agencies. This shift raises questions about transparency and international verification.

Saudi officials reference the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to justify their position, noting that the treaty supports peaceful nuclear energy development and does not explicitly ban uranium enrichment by non-nuclear-weapon states pursuing civilian programs.

The agreement’s geopolitical context adds complexity. Previous U.S. negotiations with Saudi Arabia linked nuclear cooperation to normalization with Israel, contingent on progress toward Palestinian statehood. Recent events, notably the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, have stalled this process. The initial agreement excludes Israel, though Trump recently indicated the deal’s finalization depends on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, a development that could jeopardize its approval.

The agreement now awaits congressional review, with lawmakers having 90 days to approve or reject it. While key figures like Senator Chris Murphy have expressed concern that it could trigger a regional nuclear arms race and undermine efforts to constrain Iran’s program, others including Secretary of State Marco Rubio argue safeguards prevent proliferation risks. A veto by Trump is expected if Congress rejects the deal, though overriding such a veto is unlikely.

Analysts suggest that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions are motivated by legitimate economic and security considerations. U.S. involvement, especially through American firms such as Westinghouse, would deepen ties to U.S. supply chains, sidelining competitors like China and Russia. The long-standing U.S.-Saudi security relationship adds another layer of leverage for compliance.

However, the deal’s exclusion of Israel highlights deteriorating relations between Saudi Arabia and the Netanyahu administration, complicating prospects for regional diplomatic breakthroughs.

The broader implications for Middle East nuclear proliferation remain uncertain, with worries that other countries, such as Egypt and Turkey, might pursue their own nuclear ambitions or seek to revise past agreements like those of the UAE.

As Congress prepares to debate the proposal, the focus will be on the robustness of inspection and oversight mechanisms designed to prevent misuse. While no arrangement is without risk, proponents argue that a carefully structured agreement offers the best path to balancing Saudi energy goals with nonproliferation objectives. More details are expected as the legislative review process unfolds.