The UK Supreme Court has ruled that an animal rights protest blocking a private road did not constitute the criminal offence of public nuisance under the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. This decision, delivered on July 14, 2026, allowed an appeal by six defendants who had been charged after staging a demonstration outside a dairy factory.

The protest, organised by the group Animal Rebellion on September 8, 2022, involved six individuals — James McCafferty, Alberto Garcia, Tatum Paul, Sarah Benn, Catherine Cannon, and Osian Dixon — who either chained themselves to fencing at the main entrance of Müller UK’s dairy works or glued themselves to the private road outside the site. The factory is located within the Stonebridge Cross industrial estate near Droitwich, and the blockage lasted about four hours, preventing vehicle access to and from the premises.

The defendants faced charges of intentionally or recklessly causing a public nuisance by obstructing the public or a section of the public in exercising or enjoying “a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large,” as defined under section 78(1) of the Act. At trial, their legal team argued there was no case to answer because the blocked road, Pointon Way, is a private road providing the only access to the factory site, and the general public did not have a legal right to use it.

Central to the Supreme Court’s ruling was the question of whether the public at large holds a right to pass to and from private business premises via private roads. The court found it did not. Only the landowner, lawful occupiers, and those granted a right of way or permission could use such a road legally. While employees and invited visitors to Müller UK were assumed to have such rights, the court noted no evidence existed that the general public had any right or permission to use Pointon Way. The presence of “no trespassing” signs reinforced that the owner did not grant public access.

The court distinguished between a “right” of way—a legal interest in land that imposes a duty on others not to interfere—and mere permission or licence, which can be revoked at any time and does not give rise to a legal right. Under the statute, only rights of way or legal rights fall within the scope of public nuisance protections, not licences or permissions. Therefore, obstruction of passage on a private road without a public right of access does not meet the statutory threshold.

The ruling clarified that, since no public right of passage existed and the protest did not cause or risk serious harm to the public, the defendants’ actions could not be classified as public nuisance. The court also noted that while aggravated trespass could have been an alternative charge, it was not pursued in this case.

As a result, the Supreme Court agreed with the original crown court decision to acquit the six protesters of public nuisance. The decision was unanimous, with Lord Leggatt delivering the leading judgment and Lord Sales providing a concurring opinion.