Australia is taking proactive steps to bolster its resilience against potential disruptions to its subsea data cable infrastructure, which provides the country’s primary connection to global digital networks. The initiative comes amid growing concerns over the vulnerability of these undersea cables, which are critical for everything from banking transactions to everyday internet access.
Earlier this year, National Australia Bank (NAB) led a simulation involving other major financial institutions and government officials to assess the impact of a hypothetical scenario in which Australia’s subsea cables were severed. The exercise, spearheaded by Brad Carr, NAB’s executive responsible for geopolitical risk, first imagined the loss of cables on the country’s densely cabled east coast, followed by a simultaneous cut to those on the west coast. When participants switched communications to satellites, they found that satellite systems could transmit only a fraction of the data required, highlighting their inability to replace cable infrastructure in a crisis.
The simulation revealed that repairing damaged subsea cables is a time-consuming process, complicated by logistical challenges such as the need for repair vessels to arrive on site, potential interference from hostile actors, and bureaucratic delays. Notably, several of Australia’s key cables pass through Indonesian waters, where repair permits can take over a month to secure, underscoring the geopolitical and operational risks involved.
In response, Australia’s major banks and government have developed contingency plans designed to maintain domestic financial functions even with limited or no access to international networks. These plans, part of a broader strategy called CI Fortify, require infrastructure operators to prepare for extended disruptions by isolating systems from external networks for up to three months while continuing to provide critical services. Measures include ensuring customers can still use debit cards and access cash via ATMs, and enabling banks to process essential transactions domestically without relying on international clearing systems. Officials noted this approach would be akin to “field surgery”—preserving vital functions amid significant constraints.
Similar efforts are underway in other countries. Finland has advanced related strategies, and in Sweden, the central bank has worked with retail banks and payment card providers to enable card payments during data communication outages lasting up to seven days.
Australia’s vigilance has been heightened by the expanding capabilities of China’s submarine fleet and the unexplained presence of Chinese research vessels in nearby waters. While these developments may be innocuous, Australian authorities view the potential for deliberate disruption seriously, emphasizing the importance of preparedness. Recent regional events, such as a cable crisis in Vietnam this August that damaged half of its subsea cables and reduced connectivity by 30%, offer a cautionary example of the consequences of inadequate readiness.
Given the critical role subsea cables play in the global digital economy, Australia’s efforts to design and implement backup systems demonstrate a pragmatic approach to infrastructure resilience. By planning for worst-case scenarios, the country aims to safeguard its financial system and maintain essential services in the face of disruptions, at relatively low cost.