China’s main attack helicopter, the Z-10, originally developed for ground combat and anti-armor missions, is increasingly being adapted for maritime operations, signaling a shift in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) tactical capabilities. This evolution aligns with Beijing’s broader efforts to enhance its amphibious warfare potential, particularly in the context of a possible conflict over Taiwan.

Manufactured by Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation, a subsidiary of AVIC, the Z-10 entered PLA Army service in 2010. While initially designed for battlefield support on land, the helicopter has gradually been integrated into naval exercises and shipborne trials. Recorded shipboard operations date back to 2014, when imagery showed a Z-10 landing on a Baxianshan Type 072A tank landing ship. Since then, the helicopter’s maritime role has expanded to include refueling and rearming on semi-submersible vessels and operating in proximity to the Taiwan Strait.

Satellite and open-source intelligence indicate a growing Z-10 presence on China’s southeastern coast. In December 2020, 12 Z-10s were observed at the Yuanqian helicopter base near Fujian province, directly opposite Taiwan. More recently, additional aircraft have been spotted aboard semi-submersible ships, and official Chinese media reported that the army’s Z-10s might operate from the Type 075 amphibious assault ship, expanding their operational reach.

This deployment shift is closely tied to the helicopter’s combat radius, estimated between 114 to 294 kilometers depending on configuration. Given that the Taiwan Strait’s narrowest point is approximately 130 kilometers, the PLA’s use of forward operating platforms such as semi-submersibles and amphibious ships would be critical for extending the helicopter’s effective range during operations near Taiwan. Analysts from the US Army War College’s China Landpower Studies Centre have highlighted the importance of these vessels as mobile bases for refueling and rearming in any potential amphibious assault.

In addition to coastal operations, the Z-10 has been tested for engaging maritime targets. In 2023, PLA exercises demonstrated the helicopters firing rockets at simulated sea-based threats off Fujian. Official footage from 2026 showed coordinated operations involving Z-10s, Z-20s, and Mi-17s conducting training flights out at sea, exemplifying the growing integration of attack and multi-role helicopters in naval combat scenarios.

The Z-10 was developed with input from foreign expertise, notably Russian design contributions in the mid-1990s and early Pratt & Whitney Canada engines, though production models now use domestic powerplants. Equipped with a chin-mounted 23mm cannon, anti-tank missiles, rockets, and short-range air-to-air missiles, the helicopter is tailored for anti-armor and close air support roles.

Recent upgrades to the Z-10 include enhanced armor, infrared signature reduction features, advanced identification systems, and BeiDou satellite navigation antennas. The PLA is also exploring helicopter-drone cooperation, with reported exercises involving Z-10s engaging drones and operating alongside UAVs like the KVD-002.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, approximately 200 Z-10s are currently in service with the PLA Army, with a small number operating within the Airborne Corps. The helicopter has also been exported in a modified form, the Z-10ME, which debuted publicly in 2018. Pakistan became the first confirmed foreign operator, inducting the Z-10ME into its army aviation in August 2025.

Compared to the US-made AH-64E Apache operated by Taiwan, the Z-10 is lighter and smaller, with a maximum takeoff weight roughly 3.4 tonnes less, limiting its capacity for fuel, armor, and weapons. This limitation has prompted China to develop a larger attack helicopter known unofficially as the Z-21. First observed in 2024, the Z-21 is designed for longer-range missions, featuring external fuel tanks and mast-mounted radar capabilities during recent tests. Analysts project the Z-21 could enter PLA service by the end of 2027 and may operate alongside the Z-10 and Z-19 in amphibious and air assault roles.

Overall, the expanding maritime role of the Z-10 reflects China’s effort to diversify and strengthen its rotary-wing combat capabilities, enhancing the PLA’s potential to project power in contested littoral zones such as the Taiwan Strait.