A recent study has found that even at full mobilization, China’s industrial system would be able to meet only approximately 60% of the country’s military drone demand in the event of a sudden war. The research, published on July 24 in the Journal of System Simulation, was conducted by a team led by Professor Zhang Jihai, director of the National Defence Mobilisation Research Centre at the Beijing Institute of Technology. It utilized an artificial intelligence model to simulate a multilevel supply chain, encompassing drone assembly plants as well as suppliers of components and subsystems.

The study incorporated factors such as existing inventories, production capacity, order backlogs, budgets, and the potential to convert civilian factories to military production. Despite these considerations, the researchers concluded that industrial capacity could not be rapidly expanded to meet wartime demand because establishing new production lines requires significant time. They noted that modern warfare increasingly depends not only on the performance of weapon systems but also on the ability to mobilize industrial production quickly and effectively.

The findings reflect concerns raised by recent conflicts demonstrating the rapid depletion of precision weapons. For instance, in a five-month conflict with Iran, the U.S. Army reportedly exhausted nearly its entire stock of tactical missile systems and precision strike missiles. Similarly, the ongoing war in Ukraine underscores the importance of drone production, with Pentagon officials projecting Ukraine will produce between six million and seven million small attack drones in 2026—far exceeding current U.S. production levels.

While the study highlights a significant supply-demand gap under high-intensity conflict scenarios, it also underscores that the simulation reflects only one potential wartime production capacity. Experts suggest that involvement of private companies not traditionally engaged in arms manufacturing—such as electronics, battery, vehicle, and consumer technology firms—could substantially augment China's defense manufacturing capacity. However, the conversion of civilian factories faces technical and logistical challenges and would not occur instantaneously.

Chinese dominance in the global consumer drone market, where its products constitute about 90% of the U.S. market, does not directly translate into rapid military drone production capabilities during conflict. The researchers emphasized that phases of capacity expansion and factory conversion would be triggered discontinuously and require significant adaptation.

Beyond drones, space capabilities are also a critical focus of China’s military modernization. Experts cite China’s growing reliance on satellites for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, and navigation across the Indo-Pacific region. According to Namrata Goswami, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, advancements in reusable rocket technology and rapid satellite replacement could enable China to maintain near-real-time situational awareness even during conflict, potentially mitigating damage to space-based assets.

China’s progress in lowering launch costs and developing mass-produced satellites could narrow the space technology gap with the United States, which currently leads with programs such as SpaceX’s Starship. Analysts believe that faster, more cost-effective satellite deployment would enhance China’s operational resilience and provide a strategic edge in future conflicts. The experience of Ukraine’s use of commercial satellite constellations for battlefield communication has underscored the growing importance of space assets in modern warfare, highlighting the potential impact of China's expanding space launch capabilities.