Chinese President Xi Jinping visited India in September, marking his first trip to the country in nearly seven years, as Beijing expressed a desire for both nations to become “good neighbours and friends.” The visit coincided with a broader diplomatic outreach, including Xi’s later trip to the White House, where he met with US President Donald Trump. While diplomatic and economic ties show signs of improvement—with Indian pilgrims returning to the sacred Tibetan mountain Kailash, Air China resuming flights to New Delhi, and cross-border trade exceeding $100 billion annually—military cooperation between the two countries remains stalled.

The armies of China and India, both among the world’s largest, continue to face longstanding tensions along their disputed Himalayan border. Their last joint activity was the eighth round of the Hand-in-Hand counterterrorism exercise in Meghalaya in December 2019, prior to the deadly Galwan Valley clash six months later, which left 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers dead. This incident, the first deadly confrontation on the border in 45 years, severely damaged military-to-military relations, and subsequent efforts to re-engage have been limited.

While India reopened several border trading points and restored some civilian exchanges, direct military dialogue remains infrequent and largely limited to crisis management. In contrast, the United States has established formal communication channels with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to mitigate risks of escalation. Last November, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and his Chinese counterpart agreed to build mechanisms to deconflict and de-escalate tensions, reflecting a pragmatic approach to military engagement that India has yet to fully adopt.

In August, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi agreed to expand military communication by adding two hotlines and establishing two new meeting points for senior commanders. The agreement also included a commitment to make “early and substantial” progress on resolving the border dispute. However, analysts caution that hotlines primarily serve as emergency tools and are insufficient to prevent recurring stand-offs, such as a recent incident at Taksing in Arunachal Pradesh.

Experts suggest several steps to normalize military relations. These include reviving the Hand-in-Hand exercises, which until 2019 provided a rare platform for military personnel to engage professionally, and establishing officer exchanges between India’s Defence Services Staff College and China’s PLA Army Command College, allowing each side to better understand the other's military doctrines. Additionally, instituting a fixed annual defence ministers’ dialogue and conducting joint disaster relief exercises, as seen recently in response to a glacier-rock avalanche on the Nepal-China border, could build trust and cooperation beyond crisis moments.

For India, any steps toward engagement would need guarantees of restraint in buffer zones, advance notification of major exercises, and mechanisms for joint investigations of incidents. Beijing’s incentive lies in securing a stable Himalayan front to focus on other strategic priorities, while avoiding regional perceptions of India aligning exclusively with other powers.

Upcoming diplomatic visits, including a planned trip to India by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in the context of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, highlight the region’s complex security dynamics. Nonetheless, experts emphasize that sustainable peace in Asia depends on transparent, sustained military communication directly between China and India, beyond diplomatic exchanges at higher political levels.