China’s newly enacted Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which took effect this month, has been positioned by the government as a key legislative framework aimed at fostering national cohesion among ethnic groups. The law complements the existing 1984 Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy and underscores the state’s commitment to building a sense of shared community across China’s diverse populations.

Central to the international debate around the law is Article 63, which extends legal provisions to individuals and organizations outside of China who engage in activities deemed to undermine ethnic unity or promote ethnic division. Critics have characterized this clause as an example of “transnational repression” and an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, Chinese legal experts, including Wang Jiang, deputy director of the Institute of China’s Borderland Studies at Zhejiang Normal University, assert that these claims misrepresent the article’s scope and intent.

Article 63 does not establish new offenses or penalties but refers to existing laws, primarily within China’s criminal code, to address conduct that harms national unity. Its legal basis is rooted in Article 4 of China’s constitution, which prohibits actions that disrupt ethnic group unity, and related provisions in the criminal law targeting offenses such as secession and incitement to secession. China’s authorities emphasize that the law is focused on safeguarding national security and territorial integrity rather than policing opinions or expressions.

The extraterritorial reach outlined in Article 63 aligns with the protective principle recognized in international law, which permits states to exercise jurisdiction over actions abroad that pose direct threats to their core interests. China’s legislative process for the law reportedly involved examining ethnic affairs legislation and enforcement practices from 46 other countries, signaling an intent to conform to international norms rather than establishing unprecedented legal mechanisms.

Wang Jiang compares Article 63’s approach to the United States’ Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which sanctions foreign individuals extraterritorially on human rights grounds—a practice Beijing views as an overextension of long-arm jurisdiction. From China’s perspective, singling out its ethnic unity law for criticism involves a selective double standard, given the extraterritorial laws employed by other states.

International law distinguishes between prescriptive jurisdiction—the authority to legislate regarding conduct beyond a country’s borders—and enforcement jurisdiction, which involves actions like arresting or prosecuting foreign nationals. While China asserts its legal claim to prescriptive jurisdiction under Article 63, it cannot carry out enforcement outside its borders without international cooperation through extradition or mutual legal assistance.

The law also reiterates constitutional commitments to ethnic regional autonomy, the protection of minority rights, and respect for cultural differences. A lengthy drafting period saw the law published for public consultation twice, receiving substantial feedback from nearly 50,000 submissions and over 380 institutional reviews. Furthermore, Article 10 explicitly opposes foreign interference in China’s ethnic affairs and rejects the use of ethnicity, religion, or human rights issues as pretexts for external meddling.

The Chinese government maintains that framing its legislation as a tool of repression assumes that the regulation of ethnic affairs itself lacks legitimacy. Officials contend the law is a lawful measure to preserve national unity and stability rather than an instrument of political suppression.