China has significantly expanded its military base in Djibouti with new communications infrastructure that analysts say may enhance the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) ability to gather signals intelligence in a strategically sensitive region. The base, located within 16 kilometers of US, French, Italian, and Japanese military facilities, now hosts two newly constructed communications compounds featuring a range of antennas and satellite dishes.
The Djibouti base, established by China in 2017 to support naval escort, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions, has grown into a key operational hub for Chinese naval activity in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Recent satellite imagery analyzed by the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) shows extensive construction work carried out from mid-2024 through mid-2025, including the installation of high-frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), and ultra-high frequency (UHF) antennas, steerable satellite dishes, and probable 5G arrays. One compound also contains a radome structure housing unidentified equipment, which could include a weather radar.
Experts suggest the new facilities primarily serve to improve communication between Chinese forces deployed in the region—enhancing links with ships, aircraft, and personnel—and to reduce operational risks. However, analysts caution that the infrastructure could also bolster China's capacity to monitor electronic emissions from nearby foreign militaries, including the United States and Japan. The US Air Force’s nearby Chabelley Airfield is the only authorized base in East Africa for armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, while Japan recently commenced P-1 maritime patrol flights from its Djibouti facility focused on counter-piracy and Middle East intelligence-gathering missions.
Timothy Heath, head of defense research firm Perceptum, noted that while direct content interception has not been confirmed, the PLA could use the new radios and satellite dishes to detect signal patterns—such as direction, origin, frequency, and timing—offering insights into the tempo and nature of US and Japanese military activities. He pointed to potential monitoring of counter-piracy patrols and US operations linked to tensions with Iran. These patterns, even if the communications are encrypted, might reveal which platforms are active and their operational rhythms.
Michael Bosack, director of the Parley Policy Institute, added that acquiring data on foreign military radio frequencies and communication methods could provide China with valuable electronic warfare capabilities. Such information might support efforts like signal jamming by detailing the types of transmissions and the frequency-hopping techniques employed by other forces.
CSIS emphasized that open-source data cannot confirm any active interception of communications at the Chinese base. Nevertheless, the expanded facilities could enhance China’s situational awareness in one of the world’s most militarized and geopolitically complex locales, where multiple foreign powers maintain a dense network of military installations.