Gadi Eisenkot, prime ministerial candidate and former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff, has publicly rejected the two-state solution, describing it as a “bitter mistake” in a recent interview with a right-wing Israeli newspaper. Speaking ahead of the upcoming elections, Eisenkot labeled any consideration of a Palestinian state after the events of October 7 as “delusional,” emphasizing a hardline stance on Israel’s territorial and security policies.
Eisenkot traced the roots of Arab violence against Israel back to 1851, a timeline notably longer than that cited by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has referred to roughly a century of conflict. This distinction highlights differences between Eisenkot’s Yashar party and Netanyahu’s Likud, signaling a divergence in historical framing and political approach within Israel’s right-wing factions.
The former general’s position does not suggest an impending shift toward territorial concessions, a path taken by previous military leaders-turned-politicians like Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon. Eisenkot’s platform aligns with mainstream right-wing aspirations to maintain control over disputed territories, minimize violence, and manage international backlash without yielding significant ground or political compromise.
While Eisenkot distances himself from Netanyahu on some points, his criticism remains restrained. He faults the current government’s delegation of authority over the West Bank coordination mechanisms to far-right figures such as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, arguing that this has undermined IDF sovereignty and damaged Israel’s international standing. He specifically opposes plans to expand construction in area E1, citing the substantial diplomatic consequences such actions would provoke. Eisenkot also advocates for allowing Palestinian laborers to reenter Israel as part of counterterrorism efforts, signaling a nuanced security approach within his broader hardline framework.
Eisenkot’s vision appears to be a return to the territorial and administrative status quo that existed prior to the current government’s tenure, aiming for stability with reduced settler violence and tighter IDF control. However, Netanyahu’s office continues to affirm the prime minister’s authority over military decisions in the West Bank. Recently, Netanyahu described the IDF as the ultimate sovereign actor in Judea and Samaria, executing policies authorized by the political leadership.
Critics argue that Netanyahu’s administration has avoided full responsibility for settler-related violence and policies leading to Palestinian displacement, including actions in the Jordan Valley and attacks on villages such as Hawara and Qusra. Despite allegations of war crimes and violations of international law, Netanyahu portrays himself as restrained and controlled by coalition dynamics, particularly regarding the far-right elements pressing for intensified settlement activity and displacement.
Eisenkot’s reluctance to directly hold Netanyahu accountable for these developments has prompted skepticism. Observers note that while Eisenkot highlights problematic behavior by extremist ministers, he stops short of confronting Netanyahu’s overarching role in shaping and enabling those policies. This cautious stance raises questions about how Eisenkot would differentiate his potential administration from the current government’s approach to the West Bank and Palestinian relations.
As the election campaign unfolds, Eisenkot’s challenge will be to clarify how his leadership would navigate Israel’s security and territorial dilemmas differently from his predecessor, balancing firm security measures with efforts to restore some degree of Israeli control and international legitimacy in a highly contentious region.