This month, the European Union has demonstrated an unsettled and inconsistent stance toward China, highlighting a lack of a clear strategic goal or unified approach. Within a span of days, European leaders proposed a controversial “kill switch” to limit China’s access to the EU single market, criticized Beijing in the European Parliament, dispatched a trade commissioner to negotiate in Beijing, and unveiled three new economic security measures. This series of actions revealed internal divisions and uncertainty about Europe’s priorities and objectives vis-à-vis China.
The initiative for the “kill switch” came from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron on October 5. Their proposal would authorize the EU to abruptly cut off access for a foreign power, reflecting European frustration over its growing trade deficit with China, which reached €360 billion (approximately HK$3.17 trillion) in 2025 and is projected to worsen this year. Since the adoption of an investment screening regulation in 2019—which labeled China as a “systemic rival”—the EU’s trade tools aimed at balancing relations have increased, yet economic dependency on Chinese critical assets persists despite repeated calls for “de-risking” since 2023.
Two days later, the European Parliament echoed the criticism, issuing a recommendation that acknowledged the absence of a coherent China strategy since 2019. The Parliament highlighted grievances including China’s support for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine and urged closer alignment with the United States. However, this call for transatlantic unity has been complicated by contradictions, as U.S. President Donald Trump shortly thereafter announced a diesel supply agreement with Russia, underscoring complex and sometimes conflicting international partnerships.
From October 8 to 9, the EU’s trade commissioner visited Beijing armed with a June ultimatum demanding “tangible results” and backed by July statements from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asserting that “all instruments [were] on the table.” The visit resulted in a modest agreement on three fronts: China agreed to curtail hybrid-electric vehicle exports, reduce tariffs on olive oil, car components, and footwear, and simplify licensing for rare earth materials. These concessions primarily addressed trade distortions linked to EU tariff policies and longstanding economic imbalances.
The surge in Chinese hybrid car imports, for example, was partially attributed to EU tariffs placing electric vehicles at a higher rate than hybrids. While the trade commissioner characterized the agreement as a measure to prevent “millions” of Chinese vehicles from entering European markets, critics note that limiting access largely protects established European automakers’ profit margins at the expense of more affordable consumer options.
At the European Council meeting on October 15-16, leaders reiterated concerns over “macroeconomic imbalances” and pledged to implement the “kill switch” along with additional diversification and solidarity mechanisms intended to counter possible Chinese retaliatory measures. However, China’s commerce ministry warned against employing coercive tactics, suggesting that Europe's threats are unrealistic. The planned instruments are not expected to be operational before 2027, raising questions about their immediate effectiveness and resolve.
The uncertain leadership outlook in key EU member states further complicates the situation. Chancellor Merz’s position faces speculation, and President Macron is set to leave office in May. Observers suggest that some European leaders use China as a convenient scapegoat for domestic challenges, delaying necessary reforms while projecting external blame.
Fundamental questions remain unresolved within Europe: what costs is the EU willing to bear for its policy goals toward China, and how will it balance its relationship between Washington and Beijing? Establishing a coherent retaliation doctrine and identifying vulnerabilities to Chinese economic responses are critical steps yet to be taken. Meanwhile, Europe’s recent participation in the U.S.-led technology pact focusing on semiconductors and artificial intelligence has drawn criticism for diminishing EU autonomy.
As Beijing maintains a patient, long-term strategy, it continues to gauge Europe’s internal dynamics and thresholds, often responding with measured concessions that avoid provoking full-scale conflict. The evolving interplay among Europe’s internal politics, transatlantic ties, and Sino-European relations suggests ongoing complexity and uncertainty in shaping a cohesive European approach to China.