Sudan’s ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) reflects deep political divisions underscored by economic and geographic realities, complicating calls for a formal partition akin to South Sudan’s secession in 2011.

Since late 2023, the country has seen the emergence of two rival administrations, each controlling distinct regions while vying for legitimacy. The SAF, led by Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, maintains a stronghold in the Red Sea port city of Port Sudan. There, they oversee critical state institutions, including the central bank, the Foreign Ministry, and the main transportation routes that facilitate agricultural exports—accounting for over 90 percent of Sudan’s official foreign trade. Conversely, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan “Hemetti” Dagalo’s RSF has established a quasi-government in Greater Darfur and parts of Kordofan, particularly through a self-styled civilian administration in Nyala, South Darfur. This faction has begun issuing ministerial decrees, collecting informal taxes, and providing public services such as education and healthcare within its controlled territory, despite lacking international recognition.

Parallel to the military and administrative fragmentation, a political movement labeled the “State of the River and Sea” has gained momentum in the Nile Valley. Advocates argue for a separation of northern Sudan from the Darfur and Kordofan regions, promoting the idea that a smaller, more ethnically homogeneous state would bring stability. This perspective appeals largely to northern elites and diaspora communities who view the western territories as economic burdens and sources of insecurity. However, this rhetoric runs counter to the complex on-the-ground realities that make partition practically unfeasible.

Key among these realities is the contested region of Kordofan, a strategically vital corridor linking the Nile Valley to the western provinces. Unlike South Sudan’s clear administrative borders, Kordofan’s boundaries are irregular and heavily militarized, with multiple armed communities complicating any attempt at division. The territory contains critical infrastructure, including the Muglad Basin oil fields and pipelines that transport South Sudanese crude through Port Sudan. For the SAF, control over Kordofan secures vital oil revenues and maintains access to gold and livestock resources in Darfur. For the RSF, the region enables supply routes for weapons from Libya and Chad, as well as pastoral migration pathways essential to their tribal base’s livelihood.

Darfur and Kordofan also constitute Sudan’s primary livestock hubs, with over 100 million head of camels, cattle, and sheep that support one of the world’s largest live-animal export markets. Yet these animals depend on quarantine services, veterinary checks, and refrigerated shipping facilities centralized in the port city of Port Sudan, further intertwining the economic interests of the divided factions.

Given these intertwined geographic and economic factors, analysts warn that Sudan’s factions remain locked in a violent stalemate, unable to engineer a clean break. The country faces a future characterized by persistent fragmentation, conflicted governance, and ongoing instability, with no clear pathway toward recognized partition or cohesive reunification.