GPS disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and other critical regions have raised significant safety concerns amid ongoing geopolitical tensions, particularly due to increased electronic interference affecting maritime and aviation navigation.

The Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint through which roughly 20% of global petroleum trade passes daily, has become a hotspot for deliberate GPS jamming and spoofing in the context of the U.S.-Iran conflict. These disruptions compromise the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which relies on GPS signals to broadcast vessel positions and other navigational data to prevent collisions and ensure maritime safety. Reports from the region indicate that ships have transmitted false positions—some placing vessels on land or miles from their actual locations—creating potential hazards in the narrow waters where close-quarters navigation is routine.

Such interference is not limited to the Persian Gulf. Various conflict zones, including the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and eastern Mediterranean, have experienced similar GPS disruptions. These electronic countermeasures are used for military advantage, to evade surveillance, and to disrupt enemy operations. They also affect civilian operations unintentionally or through criminal misuse. Illegal fishing fleets, oil smugglers, sanctions evaders, and others are known to exploit spoofing and jamming to mask their movements, thereby complicating enforcement and safety oversight.

Data show that GPS interference incidents impacting civil aviation surged approximately 500% between January and August 2024. This interference has led to reported cases of groundings, collisions, and emergency diversions at major airports, including Newark Liberty, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Denver International. In December 2024, GPS disruption was implicated in the diversion of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243, which was subsequently shot down by Russian air defenses, resulting in 38 fatalities. Additionally, in 2025, GPS jamming required an emergency landing for an aircraft carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

The persistence of GPS interference in the Strait of Hormuz is of particular concern, as patterns suggest systematic and sustained electronic warfare tactics rather than isolated or reactive measures. This normalization of GPS disruption threatens global maritime navigation by undermining trust in location, timing, and identification data. Such erosion of confidence poses risks not only for safety but for the economic stability tied to international shipping lanes.

Amid these challenges, organizations and researchers are exploring alternative navigation methods to increase resilience. Several nations, including the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Russia, South Korea, and China, are modernizing or redeploying long-range radio navigation systems like LORAN, originally developed during World War II. Another promising approach involves leveraging “signals of opportunity”—communications signals not intended for navigation, such as those from terrestrial cellular networks (LTE and 5G). Recent studies have demonstrated that specialized receivers can achieve sub-meter to meter-level accuracy by exploiting these signals, even in GPS-denied environments.

Additional advances utilize signals from low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, which provide stronger, more diverse, and more resilient signals than traditional medium Earth orbit GPS satellites. Experiments using signals from networks such as Starlink have successfully navigated vessels in challenging environments, including the Arctic off Greenland.

Experts emphasize that future navigation security will depend on the integration of diverse technologies rather than reliance on a single system. The deployment of these alternatives on a wide scale, however, requires coordinated policy, regulatory support, and timely investment to address the growing threat of GPS interference in critical global waterways and airspaces.