Ratko Mladić, the former Bosnian Serb general convicted of war crimes, died last week at the age of 84 in the United Nations detention facility in The Hague. His passing evokes reflection on Europe’s military and political trajectory since the 1990s, particularly concerning the continent's preparedness and strategic posture.
During the tumultuous breakup of Yugoslavia, European nations attempted to manage the crisis largely without American intervention. This approach ultimately failed, as evidenced by the subsequent conflicts and atrocities, including those for which Mladić was held accountable. The episode exposed weaknesses in Europe’s defense capabilities and collective resolve.
In the early 1990s, European military spending was substantially higher than it is today. The United Kingdom allocated around 4.2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, France 2.8 percent, and Germany 2.5 percent. By contrast, on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, those figures had fallen significantly—to 2.1 percent in the UK, 1.9 percent in France, and 1.3 percent in Germany—along with marked reductions in active military personnel.
Restoring Europe’s defensive strength to credible levels now poses a significant fiscal challenge. With heightened public debt, particularly in countries such as the UK, and limited scope to raise taxes without harming fragile economies, expanding defense budgets through conventional means is constrained. Welfare cuts or reducing social protections risk political backlash, leaving economic growth as the principal route to increase available resources for defense.
Historically, European leaders have struggled to implement growth-driven reform packages, often due to electoral resistance and a lack of immediate economic pressure. Past initiatives, like the Lisbon Agenda in the early 2000s and proposals by Mario Draghi that faltered in 2024, highlight the difficulties in sustaining substantial reform efforts. Yet, the current geopolitical environment is reshaping this calculus by framing growth as essential not merely for prosperity but for national and continental survival.
Some analysts draw parallels to Japan’s Meiji Restoration in the 19th century when the nation industrialized rapidly to avoid subjugation. They suggest Europe might face a comparable imperative, where modernization and economic expansion become central to security policy. However, democratic societies with free electoral processes may balk at connecting economic reforms with existential threats, complicating political consensus.
Governments may initiate more open discussions about vulnerabilities, particularly concerning the threat posed by Russia, to build public support for necessary changes. However, this transparency carries risks, including security liabilities and emboldening populist and far-right movements that could exploit fears or dismiss the threat as exaggerated.
The reality of security threats may force public awareness regardless. Recent incidents, such as the drone attack on Leipzig airport attributed to Russian operatives, underscore the seriousness of the danger. A more overt crisis, analogous to a coercive demonstration of power, could galvanize political will and popular acceptance of reform and increased defense spending.
Ultimately, Europe’s response to its security challenges hinges on prioritizing defense and growth above other policy areas. While cutting defense budgets after the Cold War seemed viable when economies were growing steadily, the post-2008 economic slowdown has exposed the fragility of this approach. Strengthening both economic performance and military capabilities is now seen as essential to Europe’s security architecture, with growth identified as the key enabler of sustainable defense investment. The timing and manner of this transition remain uncertain, but the imperative is increasingly clear.