In 2006, the Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation jointly launched the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (Agra), committing $150 million to improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers across 20 African countries. Agra aimed to halve food insecurity and double the incomes of 20 million households by 2020. However, nearly two decades later, the initiative’s outcomes have fallen short of these ambitious goals, raising questions about the efficacy and accountability of philanthropic efforts in development.

Since its inception, Agra has received over $1.5 billion, mostly from the Gates Foundation, with expenditures reaching $115 million in 2024 alone across its operations and focus countries. Beyond direct spending, Agra’s strategy helped establish an agricultural system centered on commercial seeds, synthetic fertilizers, and input subsidies. African governments subsequently allocated substantial public funds to support this model, with input subsidies accounting for nearly $1 billion annually across the regions involved. For example, in 2022, Malawi devoted 60 percent of its agricultural budget to subsidies, while Zambia allocated nearly 75 percent.

Despite increased fertilizer use—more than doubling—and a 46 percent expansion in cultivated land among Agra’s target countries, staple crop yield growth lagged behind projections, performing slightly below pre-Agra levels. Undernourishment rates have remained stubbornly high, with roughly one in five people still affected. As populations grew, the absolute number of undernourished individuals increased by approximately 60 percent, reaching close to 150 million—mirroring a broader trend seen across sub-Saharan Africa.

Agra maintains that it aligns its work with government priorities and does not set national policies or control resource allocation. The organization cites factors such as conflict, climate change impacts, rising costs, and population pressures as significant barriers to improving food security. Nonetheless, some local stakeholders contend that Agra plays a more directive role. In Zambia, farming groups reported that a consultative planning process was superseded by a framework developed with the direct involvement of an Agra consultant, emphasizing commercial value chains like maize and soybeans over other crops.

An institutional concern highlighted by Agra’s own evaluators is the creation of dependency. According to a review of its 2017-2021 strategy, Agra’s policy engagements have encouraged governments to seek further external support instead of building internal capacities to formulate and implement autonomous agricultural policies.

Comparisons with other approaches underline the opportunity costs associated with Agra’s model. Senegal, facing similar climatic and economic challenges, has employed far less fertilizer per hectare—about half the Agra country average—and achieved a 70 percent increase in staple crop yields. Crucially, Senegal has maintained cultivation of locally adapted crops such as millet, sorghum, and groundnuts. Its undernourishment rate dropped to around 5 percent, even as the number of undernourished people rose in Agra’s focus countries. These results suggest that food security improvements can be made through modest fertilizer use combined with the promotion of local crop varieties.

Some African governments and smallholder farmers have pursued alternate strategies emphasizing soil fertility restoration, crop and livestock diversification, and reliance on farmer-saved seeds rather than commercial inputs. By early 2026, six African nations had adopted agroecological frameworks reflecting these principles.

Despite an independent evaluation in 2021 that found Agra fell short of increasing incomes and food security for 9 million smallholders, the Gates Foundation committed an additional $195 million to the initiative. The foundation did not respond to requests for comment on Agra’s performance or future plans.

Unlike businesses subject to market forces or governments accountable to voters, large philanthropic organizations do not face comparable external pressures. While Agra has published some independent evaluations, confidentiality and partnership agreements have limited wider data disclosure. Observers argue that funders bear responsibility for ensuring transparency and linking future support to clear, enforceable performance outcomes.

The discussion around Agra underscores a broader debate over the role of philanthropy in public development. To maintain public trust and legitimacy, some experts contend that philanthropic actors must operate with greater openness and accountability, ensuring that private initiatives enhance rather than supplant democratic policy processes.