China is navigating a complex diplomatic challenge as tensions escalate over Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime route for global energy supplies. While Beijing has expressed calls for peace and stability, recent statements indicate an increasingly cautious stance toward Tehran’s actions, reflecting concerns about the impact on China’s broader economic interests in the Middle East.

Last week, President Xi Jinping, in a discussion with Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, called for an “immediate and comprehensive ceasefire” and stressed the importance of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open for normal passage. Notably, Xi did not specifically name Iran or the United States in his remarks. Earlier this month at the United Nations, Chinese Ambassador Fu Cong condemned strikes carried out by the US and Israel on Iranian targets as violations of international law but also explicitly stated that China “does not go along with Iran’s attacks on Gulf states and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.” Fu urged Iran to cease attacks on facilities in the Persian Gulf and to restore safe navigation through the strait.

Observers see these statements as some of Beijing’s clearest public criticisms of Iran’s retaliatory measures during the ongoing conflict, illustrating a delicate balance between supporting Tehran rhetorically and safeguarding China’s substantial economic and energy ties in the region. China depends heavily on stable energy supplies from the Gulf, importing nearly 90% of Iran’s oil exports. However, overall trade volumes remain relatively modest, with bilateral trade valued at around $10 billion in 2025, far less than China’s trade with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which each exceed $100 billion.

Zhu Yongbiao, director of the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at Lanzhou University, described China’s stance as “consistent and coherent” but noted that Fu’s remarks reveal mounting Chinese concerns over Iran’s disruptive conduct. He pointed out that the blockade has created “abnormal conditions” that severely disrupt global energy markets and generate unpredictable consequences. Zhu argued that Iran’s aggressive behavior risks alienating external partners and undermining efforts to resolve the conflict.

He further emphasized the significance of Fu’s phrasing, which stops short of condemning Iran outright, suggesting continuity in China’s policies rather than a fundamental shift. Zhu highlighted ongoing challenges within Tehran’s foreign policy, describing Iran’s “indecision” and diplomatic ambiguity as contributing to tensions in the bilateral relationship. Nonetheless, he maintained that the broader China-Iran partnership remains resilient, given their complementary interests and China’s increasing energy self-sufficiency driven by domestic production and investment in renewable sources.

Academic Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal echoed these views, characterizing China’s approach toward Iran as “calibrated ambiguity,” aimed at maximizing influence while minimizing risks. He pointed to China’s condemnation of US and Israeli strikes and calls for dialogue but noted Beijing’s avoidance of direct military involvement or large-scale arms sales to Tehran. Moonakal warned that if Iran continues escalating attacks in the Gulf, it could threaten Chinese assets and energy security, potentially making Tehran a liability within China’s broader Middle East strategy.

As the crisis over the Strait of Hormuz persists, Beijing appears intent on maintaining its strategic partnerships across the region without becoming entangled in conflict, underscoring the complex interplay between its economic interests and geopolitical alliances.