As tensions between Russia and Western countries continue to escalate, experts warn that information warfare targeting Britain and Europe has been underway for some time, even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Andriy Dovbenko, founder of UK-Ukraine TechExchange, highlighted instances where Russian-linked operations have been conducted through indirect channels, complicating detection efforts.

Dovbenko described situations in which communications professionals in Britain were approached by organizations seeking support for campaigns with ties to Russian interests. One recent example involved an India-based group acting on behalf of a confidential Russian client, aiming to promote narratives around Russian Geran-series drones and Ukraine’s air defenses. The group attempted to engage Western journalists, defense commentators, podcasters, YouTubers, and other content creators to generate widespread coverage across Europe. They even sought a Western politician willing to discuss the topic publicly.

The inquiries progressed to negotiations over retainers, performance benchmarks, pricing, and outreach capacity to audiences numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Although this particular proposal was ultimately declined, Dovbenko cautioned against complacency, noting it is unlikely that all such approaches are rejected.

A key concern is that these information operations rarely emanate openly from Moscow. Instead, they often come through seemingly ordinary businesses or individuals in countries maintaining standard relations with Britain, then filtered through agencies, consultants, and creators. This method obscures the true source of funding and control, presenting a challenge for identifying and countering disinformation efforts.

Dovbenko suggested that such activity may be as close as a neighboring public relations office handling what appears to be routine engagements. The goal is to blend hostile campaigns into normal business, making them harder to detect and disrupt.

While British officials and analysts focus on how the country might respond if a direct Russian attack materializes, experts like Dovbenko emphasize the importance of acknowledging that elements of the broader contest have long been active within the UK’s information environment. This ongoing, subtle campaign is designed to look ordinary, allowing covert influence to build without immediate awareness or response.