In northern Mali, the dry season has increasingly taken on roles beyond natural cycles, serving as a de facto border, courtroom, tax office, and recruitment center amid shifting dynamics driven by climate stress and governance challenges. During the 2023-24 drought, disputes over dwindling water resources intensified tensions between herders and farmers, a situation aggravated by the near absence of state officials following the collapse of Mali’s externally supported security structures.

This governance void has been filled by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an armed group that has assumed functions traditionally held by the state. JNIM operatives mediate disputes, regulate movement, and levy payments, effectively turning conflicts over scarce resources like water into broader contests over authority and profit stemming from environmental scarcity.

Contrary to the prevailing international view of climate change as simply exacerbating existing conflicts, developments in the Sahel and Horn of Africa suggest a deeper transformation. Increased climate stress is contributing directly to the erosion of governance, fragmenting territorial authority and enhancing the legitimacy of armed groups that can enforce access to land, water, and markets.

Rainfall patterns growing increasingly unpredictable, declining pasture quality, and shortened agricultural periods compound administrative shortcomings, which in turn escalate into security failures. Governments that are unable to secure wells, protect grazing routes, or arbitrate land disputes gradually cede power to armed actors capable of managing these resources.

A similar phenomenon is observable in the Horn of Africa. Somalia’s federal government remains largely centered on Mogadishu and key transport corridors, leaving rural areas vulnerable to Al-Shabab’s influence, where the group administers disputes and enforces rulings. In Sudan, protracted conflict has displaced over 10 million people and dismantled administrative functions across Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile, further eroding government presence.

In these contexts, armed groups have adeptly capitalized on environmental scarcity. JNIM operates across the tri-border Liptako-Gourma region, taxing livestock and movement. Al-Shabab’s courts have gained a reputation for predictability by consistently enforcing decisions. During shortages, insurgents can tax grain, collect zakat (obligatory charity), and redistribute resources, thereby creating rudimentary welfare structures.

The resulting scarcity has fostered a political market where communities seek predictability and security, which armed groups are positioned to provide. Livelihood collapse fuels recruitment to these groups, while absent or abusive governments deepen alienation. United Nations research indicates economic grievances and experiences of state abuse often outweigh ideological motives as drivers toward violent extremism.

Despite these realities, Western approaches remain largely misaligned, focusing heavily on counterterrorism finance, military training, intelligence, and deployments, while comparatively little investment is directed toward securing pastoral corridors, clarifying land rights, managing water resources, or scaling agricultural adaptation.

Humanitarian efforts may alleviate immediate survival needs but do not influence which actors control critical resources like grazing land and water access. Over the coming decade, political power in Africa’s fragile, climate-impacted regions is likely to be contested through control over resource governance. This demands a recalibration of security and conflict diplomacy to place climate adaptation, land management, and water governance at the heart of peacebuilding efforts, rather than treating them as ancillary concerns.

Peace negotiations traditionally focus on territorial control, political office, elections, and ceasefires. However, resource conflicts require attention to more granular and practical issues, such as the timing for opening grazing corridors, restrictions on communal wells, water pricing, and compensation for crop damage caused by livestock. While seemingly mundane, such arrangements shape whether communities recognize government legitimacy and thus whether states maintain authority in critical areas.

These evolving insights challenge conventional policymaking paradigms rooted in centralized, militarized thinking. Sovereignty is experienced locally—when contracts are honored, roads remain passable, markets operate, disputes are fairly resolved, and scarce resources are accessible without the interference of armed intermediaries. Addressing these practical governance issues linked to climate-induced scarcity may prove crucial for stabilizing some of the world’s most conflict-prone regions.