Hungary’s recent parliamentary elections, which resulted in the defeat of long-serving Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, have been interpreted by some observers as a setback for Russian influence in Europe. However, the implications for Moscow’s relationship with Budapest are expected to be more nuanced than a straightforward shift away from Moscow.

Orbán’s successor, Péter Magyar, is set to lead the country with a platform that promises a more cooperative stance toward the European Union while maintaining a nationalist and conservative approach. Although Magyar has expressed support for improving ties with Brussels, including lifting Orbán’s veto on a €90 billion EU aid package for Ukraine and increasing defense expenditures, he has also advocated for negotiations with Russia and opposed accelerated EU membership for Ukraine. This has led analysts to describe Magyar’s approach as “Orbánism without Orbán,” appealing to voters seeking continuity without the polarizing leadership style of his predecessor.

Despite these political changes, Hungary remains heavily reliant on Russia for its energy needs, which will significantly constrain Budapest’s ability to markedly alter its relationship with Moscow. The country is locked into contracts for Russian natural gas that extend through 2036, obligating payments of approximately €2 billion annually under “take or pay” terms, regardless of actual gas consumption. While the new government might seek to terminate parts of these agreements, any such move would require purchasing costlier energy alternatives amid a fragile economic environment.

Hungary has thus far benefited from an EU exemption on the 2022 ban on Russian oil imports; however, there is speculation Magyar may align Hungary with the broader EU embargo set to take full effect next year. The practical impact of this is limited in the near term due to the closure of the key Druzhba pipeline that transports Russian oil through Ukraine since January, an outage both sides blame on the other, making immediate Russian losses theoretical.

Another significant and contentious legacy of Orbán’s administration is the ongoing Paks 2 nuclear power project, financed by a nearly €10 billion Russian loan and built by Moscow’s Rosatom. Cancelling the project would impose substantial financial penalties on Hungary while creating an energy shortfall, putting Magyar in a difficult position amid regional concerns over Russian involvement and security implications.

Observers note that although Putin likely preferred Orbán’s continued leadership, Moscow has expressed relatively measured responses to his replacement. While Budapest may become more cooperative with the EU and accept conditions tied to frozen financial aid, the new government will still face domestic pressures that limit radical shifts in foreign policy. These include nationalistic sentiments, skepticism toward EU interference—particularly regarding the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine—and economic challenges characterized by sluggish growth and high public debt.

Experts highlight that Hungarian banks under Orbán facilitated channels for Russian financial dealings that circumvented international sanctions. While the central bank operates independently, Magyar’s government might influence efforts to curb these practices, though such measures could also impose short-term economic costs on Hungary.

In sum, while Orbán’s departure marks a change in rhetoric and some policy direction, Hungary’s deep economic and energy ties to Russia, coupled with domestic political realities, suggest Moscow will retain significant influence despite new leadership in Budapest.