NATO forces in Estonia are intensifying training to adapt to modern drone warfare, drawing critical lessons from the conflict in Ukraine. A multinational battle group, primarily comprising British and French troops, conducted exercises focused on electronic warfare and drone operations in subfreezing February conditions.
The "Aces Spyglass" exercise observed British soldiers from the 12th Armored Brigade undergoing a month-long course emphasizing electronic warfare, drone reconnaissance and strikes, and anti-drone tactics. Training focused on fundamental skills such as hand-eye coordination for drone controls, evasive maneuvers, and rapid attack protocols. Practical lessons included understanding drone battery performance in cold weather and the impact of rapid battery drain.
Retired General David Petraeus, who studies military technology evolution, highlighted the profound shift in combat. He stated that the changes extend beyond marginal adjustments, indicating a need for a "complete overhaul" in how war is envisioned and waged. This evolution is driven by widespread, inexpensive drones capable of threatening high-value targets, rapid technological advancements, and pervasive battlefield data making visible assets vulnerable.
During the exercise, troops deployed new technologies, including the "Kraken" system, an antenna-like device used to triangulate enemy drone positions. This system, part of a British army initiative to expedite technology deployment, was introduced in months, a notably faster pace for Western military procurement, though still longer than in Ukraine. The battle group also utilizes a 3D printer for producing drones and spare parts, fostering creative problem-solving among its younger members—a mentality deemed vital in Ukraine.
However, concerns remain regarding the full integration of these lessons into NATO's doctrines and procurement policies. While training methods and equipment have seen some adjustments, some military leaders may not have entirely absorbed the implications of contemporary warfare.
A key point of contention revolves around the vulnerability of tanks and armored vehicles in a drone-dominated environment. Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute argued that the widespread availability of inexpensive anti-tank weapons makes it increasingly difficult to operate large armored formations. Drones can disable tanks, leaving crews exposed.
Conversely, Major James Curry, second-in-command of the NATO multinational battle group in Estonia, expressed fundamental disagreement with the assertion that tanks are more vulnerable than in the past. He cited the robustness of the British Challenger 2 tank, stating its capability to withstand multiple drone strikes, and outlined multi-layered mitigation strategies for drone-saturated battlefields. These include using drones for dangerous tasks, troops sheltering in bunkers, and enhanced evasion techniques. Major Curry noted that battlefield preparation, such as identifying enemy drone outposts and deploying jammers, is crucial before committing armored units.
The scale of drone deployment in training also contrasts sharply with operational realities. The NATO battle group possesses approximately ten fiber-optic drones for training, a recent acquisition. In comparison, Russian state media reported monthly production of over 50,000 fiber-optic drones by September 2024. Ukrainian officials estimated daily deployment of 9,000 drones by October 2024, with a target to produce seven million drones this year. Russia aims to train over 70,000 drone operators in 2026.
Despite progress in training, a gap persists between current NATO capabilities and the immense scale of drone warfare observed in Ukraine, raising questions about preparedness for future conflicts.