Indonesia has resumed activities at its long-delayed Tuna gas project in the North Natuna Sea, a strategic area within Jakarta’s exclusive economic zone that has been the subject of territorial sensitivities with China. Prime Group, an Indonesian firm that recently took over operatorship from Britain’s Harbour Energy, confirmed the restart of work under the terms of the existing production-sharing contract (PSC) governing the field’s development.
The Tuna gas field lies in waters where China’s expansive South China Sea claims, represented by the nine-dash line, overlap with Indonesia’s proclaimed maritime rights. While Indonesia asserts sovereignty over the seabed and resources in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China disputes this and has previously pressured Jakarta to halt drilling activities in the area.
Prime Group’s recent job advertisements for engineering roles related to offshore production suggest preparations for early facility work, projected to begin in September. However, there is no public confirmation of resumed offshore operations to date. The project is jointly owned by Prime Group and Russian state-owned company Zarubezhneft through its subsidiary ZN Asa, each holding a 50% stake. Zarubezhneft indicated its readiness to proceed with the development with government backing, despite ongoing complications arising from international sanctions on Russia.
Indonesia’s energy ministry approved a development plan for Tuna in late 2022, valued at around $3.07 billion, anticipating peak production of approximately 115 million standard cubic feet (3.26 million cubic meters) of gas per day by 2027. Delays and the change in operatorship have since altered this timeline, but the project remains significant for Jakarta’s strategy to enhance energy self-sufficiency and counter declining domestic oil and gas output.
Observers note the project carries implications beyond energy alone. Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, a maritime law specialist at the University of Indonesia, highlighted that while the field’s production potential is important practically, its political and sovereignty dimensions in a contested maritime zone are substantial. Indonesia has experienced diplomatic friction, including a notable standoff in 2021 when Chinese vessels challenged Jakarta’s drilling at Tuna. More recently, in October 2024, Indonesian authorities repelled Chinese coast guard vessels that disrupted a seismic survey in the same general area.
Analysts suggest the recent developments will put to test President Prabowo Subianto’s approach to balancing Indonesia’s economic interests and maritime claims amid unresolved disputes with China. Yohanes Sulaiman, an expert in Indonesian foreign policy, likened Jakarta’s approach to Malaysia’s pattern of quietly pursuing resource development while minimizing public confrontation over sovereignty issues.
Despite close economic ties with China, Indonesia appears to maintain a cautious stance on security matters linked to the Natuna area. Aristyo emphasized that the unresolved maritime tensions limit the scope for full trust between the two countries on security cooperation. Nevertheless, Jakarta is expected to advance the Tuna project, aiming to keep related tensions out of the public eye while asserting its maritime rights.