The recent U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, which included the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in February, has intensified domestic debates within Iran about the future of its nuclear program. Traditionally anchored by a religious edict from Khamenei nearly two decades ago prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons, Iran’s nuclear policy now faces growing calls from hardline factions to abandon this stance, potentially withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and pursuing nuclear arms.

Hardline politicians, analysts, and lawmakers argue that recent military confrontations have transformed nuclear weapons from a strategic ambition to an existential necessity. Activists close to hardline circles have suggested that the increasing threats from the United States and Israel justify reexamining the religious ban on nuclear weapons, citing the adaptability of Shia Islamic jurisprudence to changing circumstances. Hassan Ghashghavi, a member of the parliament’s National Security Committee, noted that Iran’s leader could issue a new religious ruling on this matter, signaling possible flexibility in Tehran’s nuclear doctrine.

Supporters of nuclear armament have pointed to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities as a deterrent that has prevented foreign intervention. According to some insiders, Khamenei’s death has significantly boosted support for nuclear weapons within the regime, with estimates suggesting that backing has risen from near zero to over 50 percent. This shift partly reflects a perception among regime loyalists that the ongoing conflict with the United States is existential. A prolonged bombing campaign that resulted in the deaths of numerous Iranian leaders and officials, alongside explicit threats from U.S. political figures, has heightened Tehran’s security concerns. Statements by former President Donald Trump threatening to destroy Iran’s “civilisation” reportedly fueled speculation within the regime about potential use of tactical nuclear weapons against the country.

Despite this growing debate, Iran’s official position remains that it does not intend to develop nuclear arms. Mohammad Eslami, Iran’s top nuclear official, reported the continuation of nuclear power projects to produce 20,000 megawatts of electricity even amid the ongoing war. Meanwhile, reformist politicians caution against overt nuclear proliferation, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding the nation and the Islamic Republic over escalating enrichment levels.

Experts describe the internal discussions as serious but not indicative of an immediate policy shift. Ali Vaez, an Iran specialist, stated that the war has strengthened voices advocating for a nuclear deterrent but suggested Tehran may prefer to preserve its nuclear infrastructure as leverage in negotiations rather than embarking on overt weaponization. The future trajectory appears contingent on whether Iranian leadership believes nuclear weapons would prevent future attacks or provoke further conflict.

Since 2003, following a halt to its nuclear weapons program, Tehran's nuclear activities have intensified considerably, especially after the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Iran is recognized as a “threshold state” with the capacity to weaponize its enrichment program if it chooses, although recent U.S. strikes in June 2025 heavily damaged key nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. There remains significant international concern about Iran’s stockpile of approximately 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity—close to weapons-grade levels. This stockpile is reportedly secured beneath the rubble of these bombed sites.

The United States has demanded Iran remove this enriched uranium from its territory, but Tehran resists, instead offering to discuss diluting the material as part of a broader deal that would include lifting sanctions and releasing frozen assets. However, these conditions have thus far been unacceptable to Washington.

Since the 2025 conflict, Iran has denied the International Atomic Energy Agency access to its principal nuclear sites. Under NPT rules, withdrawal requires a three-month notification to other parties and the UN Security Council, a move that Tehran could employ as a bargaining tool. Iranian officials have stated that abandoning the treaty is not an immediate priority, though signals indicate the possibility remains dependent on evolving circumstances.

Within hardline circles, views differ on the forms deterrence should take, with some advocating for unconventional weapons such as “dirty bombs” as alternatives or complements to nuclear arms. Nonetheless, the principal barrier to weaponization is often cited as hesitation within the regime’s power structure rather than solely religious prohibitions.

As Iran navigates its post-Khamenei leadership amid ongoing conflict and external pressures, the future of its nuclear strategy continues to be a critical and closely watched issue in regional and global security discussions.