Groups linked to Iran continue to pose a security threat to Israel and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) personnel in southern Syria, according to an analysis released Sunday by the Alma Research and Education Center, a non-profit think tank. The report highlights continued efforts by Iranian-backed operatives to establish or reactivate local networks along the border region.
The latest incident involved an IDF strike on Friday targeting a vehicle near the Lebanese-Syrian border. The military identified the vehicle’s occupant as Yusuf Ali al-Hassoun, a Syrian militant said to have "planned and advanced attacks" against Israeli forces under Iranian direction. Based on al-Hassoun’s operational patterns, the Alma Center assessed that he was likely affiliated with Iranian-backed networks in Syria, potentially linked to Unit 840, a Quds Force special operations unit, or Branch 4000 of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization. The center also acknowledged the possibility of his direct association with Hezbollah.
The strike took place near the town of Hawsh al-Sayyed Ali in Lebanon’s Hermel district, an area that could suggest al-Hassoun was en route to meet with Iranian or Hezbollah handlers. Both Iran and Hezbollah have been known to maintain local cells in the region, operating not just directly but also through Syrian intermediaries.
According to the Alma Center, many of these networks were initially established under the Assad regime with cooperation from Syrian military and security elements. However, their activities have persisted following the takeover by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces in 2024. Since the regime change, Iran and Hezbollah have reportedly continued efforts to rebuild and activate local networks, recruiting members not only from Shi’ite communities but also from Sunni and Druze populations, often using financial incentives rather than ideological appeals.
The Druze community in Syria remains divided on Israel’s role. Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, the Druze spiritual leader in Sweida, has voiced support for Israel, particularly citing humanitarian aid following the July massacres. In contrast, prominent Druze leaders Sheikh Hammoud al-Hinnawi and Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou have disavowed any support for Israel and instead back Sharaa’s government, opposing external intervention in sectarian conflict.
The Alma Center pointed to a series of related episodes underscoring ongoing Iranian and Hezbollah activity in southern Syria. These included the July 2025 arrest of local operatives allegedly directed by the Quds Force, and the disruption of rocket-preparation cells in the Quneitra area in September 2025 and April 2026. On June 28, the IDF killed two armed Syrian Shi’ite operatives believed to have been dispatched from northern Syria to launch attacks near the village of Hader. More recently, on September 29, Syrian security forces announced the capture of a Hezbollah-affiliated three-member cell in western Daraa’s Yarmouk Basin region; the cell was reportedly attempting to build infrastructure for rocket launches targeting Israel.
Two additional incidents last week raised concerns about potential attempts to probe IDF defenses. On October 4, a 22-year-old Palestinian resident of Damascus was killed while attempting to infiltrate an IDF position in the al-Hamidyah area. The following day, Israeli troops fired upon two individuals approaching an IDF post on a motorcycle under suspicious circumstances.
Even if these recent events are not directly connected, the analysis concluded they collectively demonstrate a persistent security threat emanating from southern Syria, fueled by Iranian and Hezbollah efforts to activate local networks and test Israeli military vigilance in the region.