Drone attacks launched from Iraqi territory targeting Saudi Arabia in recent months have exposed a growing and complex security challenge within Iraq’s irregular armed groups, underscoring difficulties faced by Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi’s government in asserting control over militant networks operating on Iraqi soil.

The attacks, which include strikes on Saudi oil facilities and infrastructure, have been attributed by Riyadh to Iran-affiliated militias operating out of Iraq. In July, Saudi officials explicitly accused such militias of launching drone assaults on sites in the Eastern Province and Riyadh itself. In response, Saudi forces coordinated with the US Central Command to conduct retaliatory strikes against locations inside Iraq linked to these militant groups.

Following a recent attack on a pipeline earlier this month, Saudi Arabia again pointed to Iraq as the launch site of the drones but refrained from naming specific factions. At the request of Prime Minister Al-Zaidi, Saudi Arabia delayed direct military action, allowing Baghdad an opportunity to investigate and respond, while maintaining its right to defend its security interests.

Al-Zaidi’s government acted swiftly, tracing the launch origins to Maysan province. In a series of measures aimed at sending a strong security and political signal, the regional operations commander was dismissed, several security officials were interrogated and held accountable, and targeted field operations were conducted near the Iranian border. Despite these actions, authorities have yet to identify the individuals commanding the attacks or to clarify the chain of command responsible.

This situation reflects an evolving landscape in Iraq’s militia network. Analysts point to a shift away from larger, well-known armed factions toward smaller, more radical and covert cells that operate independently from established political and militia hierarchies. These groups, often reportedly linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, have gained influence and operational freedom, making it more difficult for the government to trace orders back to their source.

Reports indicate that such cells have been formed in southern Iraq, functioning outside traditional command structures. This dispersal of responsibility and decentralization of operations complicate efforts to regulate or disarm militias. Weapons and militant activity are no longer easily tied to identifiable groups or leadership, challenging Prime Minister Al-Zaidi’s promise to bring all arms under state control by the September 30 deadline marking the final withdrawal of US military forces from Iraq.

Faction leaders such as those of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat Al-Nujaba have demonstrated resistance to the idea of relinquishing control over their weapons, illustrating a lack of consensus within Iraq’s political landscape on what effective “control” entails. Consequently, discourse has shifted from outright disarmament toward concepts of regulation or freezing of weapons, reflecting deeper disagreements about power dynamics within the state.

While Baghdad may ultimately succeed in curbing the military capabilities of well-established militias, experts warn that more clandestine, shadowy networks could expand in their stead. This evolution would transform Iraq’s security dilemma from simply lacking a monopoly on arms to facing the more daunting challenge of an opaque command structure, where the decision-makers behind violent operations remain unknown and unaccountable.