Israel entered its current multi-front conflict with weakened domestic weapons-production capabilities, insufficient stockpiles of some arms, and no fully budgeted policy to safeguard local arms manufacturing, according to a report released Tuesday by State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman.

The report evaluated Israel’s ability to sustain domestic production of weapons, raw materials, components, and related infrastructure crucial to the defense establishment and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Englman’s findings indicate that over the past two decades, critical production lines for weapons-related raw materials were either lost or diminished. This decline was attributed in part to reduced orders and a preference for cheaper foreign procurement.

These vulnerabilities were exacerbated after the war began, as the IDF’s demand for weapons and components surged. Restrictions and embargoes by several countries, including some regarded as friendly to Israel, hindered the supply of arms and essential materials. Additionally, global shortages intensified due to heightened demand following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, complicating procurement efforts further.

Englman’s report highlights that, on the eve of the war, the IDF’s stock of certain weapons fell short of targets set for the end of 2024. In some cases, the procurement targets themselves were established below the actual operational requirements projected for that period. Analysis also revealed that between December 2016 and the outbreak of hostilities, the Defense Ministry had placed no orders for certain weapon types, aside from a single order in June 2023 scheduled for delivery by the end of 2024. Most orders to replenish these weapons were reportedly initiated only after the conflict began.

The report criticizes the political leadership for failing to establish a comprehensive, properly budgeted policy aimed at maintaining independence in domestic weapons production prior to the war. While some former defense ministers engaged with aspects of the issue, they did not address the full spectrum of capabilities, set clear priorities, secure funding, or bring the matter to the National Security Council or prime minister for deliberation. The security cabinet also reportedly did not hold dedicated discussions on this subject or on plans to prepare for emergency production acceleration.

Internally, the Defense Ministry’s efforts fell short, according to the report. Production capability assessments conducted in 2021 and 2022 lacked involvement from the IDF and did not fully review all components, raw materials, or manufacturing technologies used domestically. Consequently, the defense establishment lacked a comprehensive understanding of what weapons could be produced entirely in Israel, the financial implications, and prioritization criteria.

The absence of a structured plan to mitigate risks associated with foreign procurement dependency was another key finding. The report suggested that such a plan might have involved diversifying suppliers, negotiating state-to-state agreements, or stockpiling critical raw materials—measures that were not sufficiently developed before the war.

Engelman’s assessment of the operational impact diverges from the IDF’s official stance. The comptroller concluded that shortages in domestic weapons production capacity and missing stockpiles affected the pace of certain operations and posed risks to soldiers under specific conditions. The IDF, however, contended that its combat capabilities remained uncompromised and that no soldiers’ lives were endangered due to ammunition or weapons shortages. The military emphasized ongoing efforts to address gaps and maintain operational readiness across multiple fronts over more than two years.

The Defense Ministry affirmed that domestic munitions production remains central to its strategy and priority list. Since the conflict began, the ministry claims to have accelerated production significantly—by several hundred percentage points—through new infrastructure, expanded production lines in critical sectors, and improved raw material management. It is currently advancing a broad, multi-billion-shekel plan aimed at achieving domestic weapons-production independence, including an emergency acceleration component within the "Shield of Israel" force-building framework approved by the prime minister and defense minister. This plan involves investments totaling roughly NIS 350 billion over a decade.

The report’s release coincides with a larger post-October 7 reassessment of Israel’s defense posture. Defense planning now includes expanding advanced fighter aircraft fleets and envisages a long-term shift in U.S. military aid toward closer joint defense and technology partnerships.

Englman recommended that the security cabinet review the Nagel Committee’s proposals concerning the defense budget and force-building, specifically those relating to increasing domestic arms production independence. He also urged the Defense Ministry to draw lessons from repeated issues of erosion in production capabilities, to monitor essential manufacturing lines in collaboration with defense industries, and to include raw-material production in ongoing oversight.

Further recommendations called for establishing budgets and action plans for stockpiling critical materials and components during routine periods to enable accelerated production in crises. Englman also advised that regular updates of domestic production capability mappings, priority setting, budgeting, and presentation of these issues to the security cabinet become integral elements of multi-year defense planning.