Japan is advancing significant defence developments aimed at preparing for the possibility of a protracted conflict linked to a potential crisis over Taiwan, reflecting a notable shift in its military posture. Central to these efforts is the recent acquisition of a former Nippon Steel site in Kure, Hiroshima prefecture, where the government plans to establish a large defence hub integrating military facilities, logistics, and defence production capabilities.

The location of the new complex is strategically important. Kure already hosts one of Japan’s major naval bases, and the Hiroshima prefecture lies in proximity to Japan’s southwestern islands—areas considered critical in the event of regional tensions involving Taiwan and China. Japanese officials have emphasized that the facility is intended to enhance the Self-Defence Forces’ (SDF) ability to sustain prolonged operations, underlining a broader plan to build resilience against possible missile strikes, disrupted communications, and extended attrition.

This expanded focus on endurance marks a departure from Japan’s traditional post-war defence posture, which primarily centered on constitutional pacifism and purely defensive capabilities. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi articulated concerns last November about a Taiwan contingency escalating into a situation threatening Japan’s survival, potentially justifying SDF actions even in the absence of a direct attack on Japanese territory.

Strategic revisions are accelerating, with Tokyo bringing forward updates to its National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, and Defence Buildup Programme by a year. These changes address “new ways of warfare” and increasing demands for sustained conflict readiness. The defence ministry’s budget request for fiscal 2027 seeks 8.9 trillion yen, a record figure intended to strengthen sustained response abilities, adapt to novel warfare domains, and bolster Japan’s defence production and technology base.

Japanese experts indicate that these preparations are aimed at withstanding possible missile attacks on bases, ports, and communication sites, particularly given the proximity to Taiwan and the strategic importance of the southwestern Nansei Islands. The islands could serve both as defensive positions and as launch points for surveillance, anti-ship missile deployments, and unmanned systems aimed at countering People’s Liberation Army (PLA) movements through the East China Sea and western Pacific.

While Japan emphasizes that its defence buildup is not intended to facilitate an active combat role in resolving Taiwan’s status, analysts note the necessity for resilience in the face of potential PLA operations that could directly target Japanese territory and US military installations based in Japan. The robustness of Japanese defensive infrastructure could complicate PLA assumptions about the speed and ease of neutralizing Japan’s operational capabilities, potentially serving as a deterrent by forewarning a costly, prolonged conflict.

The defence ministry is also working to address logistical challenges involving ammunition, fuel, and equipment availability, with efforts to expand stockpiles, harden facilities, and reorganize logistics management to enhance flexibility during crisis conditions. Investment in unmanned systems and space-based communications further seeks to mitigate manpower constraints and maintain operational coordination under attack.

On the alliance front, Japan is strengthening joint command structures with the United States. The Japan SDF Joint Operations Command, established in March 2025, now works alongside an expanded US Forces Japan headquarters designed to sustain continuous wartime operations and improve bilateral command procedures.

However, China views Japan’s defence modernization differently. Beijing’s defence ministry has accused Tokyo of exaggerating the “China threat” to justify moves away from its post-war military restraints and claimed Japan’s actions are part of a remilitarization trend that interferes with its internal affairs regarding Taiwan. Japan rejects these characterizations, insisting its efforts are purely defensive and aimed at national protection.

Observers argue that Japan’s preparations, including investments in resilience and affordable unmanned platforms, correspond to expectations of a conflict extending over months. While defensive in nature, they carry implications for the broader regional balance. Strengthened Japanese capabilities could indirectly complicate China’s aspirations over Taiwan by raising the costs of expanding a conflict into Japanese territory.

Overall, Japan’s increased defence readiness reflects a strategic acknowledgment that any conflict involving Taiwan is likely to impact Japan directly. Its ability to remain operational and integrated with US forces will be crucial to the region’s security dynamics, as any degradation of Japanese infrastructure could hinder US support for Taiwan and elevate Beijing’s leverage through both military and psychological means.