Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration recently demonstrated an enhanced military capability by firing a supersonic anti-ship missile during a joint military exercise, signaling deeper integration with the island’s navy and expanding its defensive posture. On September 18, the coastguard vessel Qijin, part of the Anping-class patrol fleet, launched a home-grown Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) missile that struck a decommissioned naval frigate target more than 100 kilometers away. The exercise also featured the firing of an older HF-2 subsonic missile, involving coordinated efforts among Taiwan’s army, navy, and air force.

This development marks a continuation of a broader strategy to equip Taiwan’s coastguard vessels with anti-ship missiles and integrate them more closely into the island’s defense framework. The Anping-class ships, which are modeled on the navy’s Tuo Chiang-class corvette, can be armed with up to 16 HF-2 and HF-3 missiles when mobilized for wartime operations. At least three vessels from the 12-ship class have now demonstrated the ability to fire these missiles, reflecting a push to build additional naval strike platforms beyond the conventional military.

Experts like John Bradford, former U.S. Navy officer and executive director of the Yokusuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies, described the move as a visible sign of growing cooperation between the coastguard and navy. He noted that while such arrangements have long existed, “the two forces are definitely getting closer, learning to cooperate and identifying ways to complement each other,” with new forms of joint operations emerging.

The arming of coastguard vessels with heavy weaponry is uncommon internationally, as these agencies typically focus on law enforcement and maritime safety. Taiwan, however, has legally prepared for this by incorporating the coastguard into its wartime defense plans. Under Taiwan’s National Defence Act, the government can transfer the coastguard to military command during conflict. A 2021 defense procurement law further supports equipping the service with wartime weapon systems as part of a planned transition from peacetime to wartime roles.

By contrast, China's approach involves integrating its coastguard more directly into its military structure. Since 2018, the China Coast Guard has been under the People’s Armed Police, subordinate to the Central Military Commission. This shift is codified in the 2021 Coast Guard Law, which permits the agency to conduct defense operations. Beijing has also transferred several navy corvettes to the coastguard, stripping their missile and torpedo systems but retaining their patrol capabilities. The Chinese coastguard has played a visible role in exercises around Taiwan, raising concerns about potential blockade scenarios.

Some analysts caution against equating Taiwan’s model with Beijing’s military-coastguard fusion. Simona Grano, a China-Taiwan expert at the University of Zurich, emphasized that Taiwan’s coastguard remains civilian in peacetime and is preparing specifically for wartime roles, making its institutional and political context different from that of China’s coastguard.

Taiwan’s missile-armed coastguard vessels first appeared in exercises as early as 2005 and have gradually expanded their capabilities and operational integration. During this year’s August Han Kuang drills, the Bali, another Anping-class ship, conducted missile strikes alongside navy missile boats under the Littoral Operations Command, highlighting joint strike potential.

In the wake of the recent drill, Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council announced that a navy flag officer would fill a newly reinstated third deputy director general position within the coastguard, reflecting the agency’s increasing military-related responsibilities and closer collaboration with the navy.

While a Taiwan coastguard expert, speaking anonymously, acknowledged that missile-equipped coastguard ships could bridge the gap between law enforcement and military actions during crises, he also warned of risks in blurring these roles, potentially complicating conflict escalation and crisis management. For the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the presence of such armed coastguard vessels adds complexity to planning, as they must now consider these “white hull” vessels as legitimate anti-ship missile threats alongside the navy’s “grey hulls.”

Despite these changes, experts like Bradford do not consider the missile-armed coastguard a decisive factor in the broader military balance. Given the vast scale of the PLA Navy and Air Force, such capabilities “are not going to be a game-changer,” but they do introduce additional operational challenges and risks that could affect PLA decision-making.

Taiwan remains under threat from China, which views the island as a breakaway province to be reunified by force if necessary. Most countries, including the United States, do not recognize Taiwan as independent but oppose any unilateral attempts to alter the status quo by military means. The expansion of Taiwan’s coastguard missile capabilities appears to be part of its broader strategy to deter aggression and complicate potential PLA military operations in the region.