Gulf states are reassessing their security strategies amid the ongoing conflict involving Iran, highlighting challenges to China’s cautious engagement approach in the Middle East. As the war enters its sixth month, regional leaders are confronting the reality that neither the United States nor China can fully shield them from Iranian attacks, prompting a shift toward more self-reliant defense arrangements.
On Wednesday, the Iranian military warned that any potential future conflict with the United States could expand across the region and target critical energy and communications infrastructure. In response to growing security concerns, Kuwait recently signed a military cooperation agreement with Pakistan aimed at enhancing its defensive capabilities through training and support. This deal closely followed a trilateral pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, which includes a collective defense clause reminiscent of NATO’s mutual assistance principle. Analysts suggest this arrangement could set a precedent for other U.S.-aligned countries seeking greater strategic independence.
Observers note that the war has accelerated a regional recalibration of alliances. Zhu Zhaoyi, executive director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at Beijing’s Pangoal Institution, said the conflict underscored the gradual decline of U.S. dominance in the Middle East and the increasing strategic autonomy exercised by middle powers such as Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
Earlier in the conflict, Gulf states had hoped China’s influence over Iran might help achieve a negotiated settlement. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi engaged in extensive diplomatic outreach, speaking with counterparts from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations as well as officials from Iran, Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. In April, President Xi Jinping proposed a four-point peace plan during a meeting with Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
Despite these diplomatic efforts, attacks by Iran against Gulf states have persisted. According to Naser al-Tamimi, a London-based political analyst and founder of the consultancy MidEast Strategia, China’s leverage over Iran is substantial but does not translate into control over Tehran’s decisions. He emphasized that Beijing has not demonstrated willingness to invest significant political or military capital to restrain Iran for the benefit of Gulf partners, reflecting China’s preference for a non-interventionist policy.
Ahmed Aboudouh, associate fellow at Chatham House and head of the China Studies Unit at the Emirates Policy Centre, described Beijing’s stance as one of “involvement without commitment,” aimed at minimizing risks rather than expanding influence.
Tamimi also noted a broader shift among Gulf states to balance longstanding security ties with the United States alongside growing economic and diplomatic relations with China. This marks a move away from hedging strictly between great powers toward reducing dependence on any single actor.
China’s Middle East policy, once hailed for brokering the 2023 Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement and fostering Palestinian factional unity, now faces uncertainty amid renewed tensions. Aboudouh warned that Iran’s continued targeting of Gulf states undermines China’s model of regional reconciliation and could jeopardize its diplomatic standing.
Zhu cautioned that Beijing must avoid entanglement in regional rivalries to maintain its role as a leading Global South actor, noting that forced alignment in the conflict would damage China’s carefully cultivated position. The evolving regional dynamics suggest China’s ambitions to serve as a neutral peacemaker may be tested as Gulf states pursue more autonomous and diversified security postures.