The ongoing royal commission into antisemitism in Australia faces a critical question: will federal ministers be publicly called to account? While some members of the executive may have already provided evidence behind closed doors, the inquiry appears poised to demand greater transparency from government leaders about their response to antisemitism and related security concerns.

Commissioner Virginia Bell, who released an interim report in April, is set to begin a key phase of public hearings this week, focusing initially on antisemitism in online spaces and mainstream media. By the end of next month, the inquiry will turn its attention to universities and their role in addressing such issues. Central to this stage is evaluating whether sufficient action was taken by all relevant parties to counter antisemitism, particularly following the October 2023 Hamas terrorist attack.

A significant aspect under scrutiny is the effectiveness of current government policies aimed at curbing hateful online speech, with an emphasis on antisemitic and ideologically motivated extremist content. Given that cabinet ministers oversee these policy settings, many argue that they should be questioned publicly on their handling of these matters.

The commission’s interim report also highlighted a notable decline in counter-terrorism funding within security and intelligence agencies between 2020 and 2025 as a proportion of the national intelligence community’s overall budget. The report raises concerns about whether resource allocation matched emerging threats during this period.

However, views within the intelligence community diverge on this interpretation. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Director-General Mike Burgess has challenged the suggestion that reduced counter-terrorism funding contributed to security failures. In a recent National Threat Assessment, Burgess stated that counter-terrorism resourcing increased significantly after the national threat level was raised to "probable" in 2024. He noted that the number of ASIO officers dedicated to counter-terrorism in 2025 was nearly double the number in 2005.

Burgess cautioned that the current security environment is marked by multiple simultaneous threats requiring careful prioritization. He rejected claims that counter-terrorism was deprioritized, emphasizing the need to address all major threats concurrently, including antisemitism, protection of critical infrastructure, and strategic alliances such as AUKUS.

The royal commission has yet to confirm whether it plans to revisit the issue of counter-terrorism resourcing or explicitly summon ministers as witnesses, but it has not ruled out either possibility. Much may depend on revelations from cabinet documents recently ordered to be released despite government attempts to withhold them on public interest grounds. These materials could shed light on the decision-making processes underpinning intelligence and security priorities and funding allocations.

Since the Bondi attack, the government has been reported to have sought to shield ministers from public scrutiny, a stance reflecting Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s initial hesitation to establish the royal commission. Nonetheless, commissioner Bell’s rejection of the government’s confidentiality claims regarding cabinet discussions signals that ministers may soon face heightened accountability.

As the inquiry proceeds, the extent to which the executive is held responsible remains a pivotal question, shaping not only the commission’s findings but also broader public confidence in the government’s capacity to address antisemitism and national security threats.