Australia’s Hunter-class frigate program, marked by the recent laying of the first keel in Adelaide, has attracted sharp criticism over cost, capability, and strategic value amid concerns about the nation’s broader defense posture. The initiative to replace the aging Anzac-class frigates with nine new vessels has evolved into a costly and contentious project reflecting longstanding challenges in Australian defense procurement and planning.
The Hunter-class frigates are based on the British BAE Systems Type 26 design, selected for its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. However, this choice has raised questions due to the Type 26’s protracted development timeline; even eight years after the initial Australian commitment, the British navy has yet to commission the ship. Analysts have noted that the Australian variant has grown substantially heavier—from about 8,800 tonnes originally to approximately 10,500 tonnes—without upgrading the propulsion system, a modification that risks reductions in speed and operational range.
Cost overruns have been significant. Initial estimates of $30 billion for nine frigates have inflated to around $45 billion, prompting the government to reduce the order to six ships and currently commit contracts for only three. With a projected budget of $27 billion for these three vessels—approximately $9 billion each—the Hunter-class frigates rank among the most expensive to date. Delivery of the first ship is not expected until 2032, with active service likely by 2034.
Critics argue the Hunter-class design inadequately addresses Australia’s strategic needs. Equipped with just 32 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, the ships possess fewer missile cells than similar-sized modern warships, which typically have between 96 and 112 VLS cells. Former Royal Australian Navy Chief Vice-Admiral David Shackleton has expressed concerns that the Hunters lack the firepower required for future naval challenges.
The Hunter’s primary role as an ASW platform has also been questioned. Experts highlight the complexity of effective anti-submarine operations, which generally require integrated efforts involving attack submarines, specialized aircraft, and extensive intelligence support over large maritime areas. Given the relatively small size of Australia’s surface fleet and limited assets, it is unclear whether the Hunters can effectively track and counter advanced nuclear submarines, such as those operated by China. Observers point out the inherent difficulty of a slower, underpowered frigate successfully locating and engaging stealthy nuclear-powered submarines.
Some analysts suggest the Hunter-class frigates may find utility primarily as niche contributors within larger U.S.-led naval operations, relying heavily on alliance support rather than serving as independently capable platforms. This critique reflects a broader debate about Australia’s defense strategy, which some argue prioritizes fulfilling alliance roles over maintaining autonomous strategic weight.
In contrast to the Hunter program, the Australian government’s recent decision to acquire 11 Japanese Mogami-class frigates has been viewed more favorably. These smaller, less expensive vessels offer comparable VLS capacity, enhanced weaponry, and extended range. At least the first three Mogamis will be built in Japan with minimal design changes, potentially providing a more cost-effective augmentation to Australia’s surface fleet.
Overall, the Hunter-class frigate project underscores ongoing concerns about cost management, capability alignment, and strategic priorities within Australia’s defense establishment, as the nation seeks to navigate a complex and increasingly contested Indo-Pacific security environment.