As Iran and Oman consider introducing fees for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, attention has turned to the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia as a potential model. Both waterways are critical maritime chokepoints for global energy supplies, with the Strait of Malacca carrying about 23 million barrels of oil daily, slightly more than the pre-war 21 million barrels that passed through the Strait of Hormuz. They share geographic vulnerabilities due to their narrow passages, but experts highlight important differences that limit how closely the Malacca model can be applied to the Hormuz.

The Strait of Malacca links Europe and the Middle East with East Asia, handling roughly one-third of global trade. It is particularly critical for China, which relies on the strait for approximately 80 percent of its imported oil—a dependency sometimes referenced as the “Malacca Dilemma.” The strait extends about 900 kilometers, significantly longer than the Strait of Hormuz, and supports a diverse vessel traffic of some 100,000 ships annually, transporting goods ranging from oil to consumer products like furniture and electronics.

Unlike the Strait of Malacca, which offers alternative routes such as the Lombok Strait (albeit with increased transit times and costs), the Strait of Hormuz serves as the sole maritime gateway to the Persian Gulf. This exclusivity enhances the strategic leverage of Iran and Oman, the two countries bordering Hormuz. Oman has proposed that it and Iran collect charges from ships passing through the strait, although details remain unclear. Some officials suggest payments would be voluntary, while others claim they would be mandatory. The proposal—a significant shift from traditional maritime practices that recognize freedom of navigation through international waters—has been partly modeled on arrangements at the Strait of Malacca.

For decades, the Strait of Malacca’s administration has been marked by cooperation among Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, with no ship passage fees. Instead, vessels pay for specific navigational services such as towing or pilotage assistance, especially given the strait’s narrowest point of just under two nautical miles. By contrast, the Strait of Hormuz is wider, about 21 nautical miles across, but the political and security contexts differ markedly. Analysts emphasize that Iran’s recent actions—including attacks on ships and deployment of sea mines—pose direct threats to navigation in Hormuz, conditions absent in Southeast Asia.

The cooperative model in Southeast Asia arose from regional efforts beginning in the 1960s, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established to foster dialogue and avoid military conflicts. The countries bordering the Malacca strait worked together to improve safety by establishing navigation lanes, dredging, and implementing coordinated oversight. Financial and technical assistance came from external partners such as Japan’s Nippon Foundation, which helped fund surveys, maritime equipment, and later security initiatives including responses to piracy.

Attempts to introduce voluntary transit fees in the Strait of Malacca were proposed in 2007 but rolled back amid concerns about contravening international maritime law and fears that it might set precedents for other straits. Instead, a cooperative mechanism known as the Aids to Navigation Fund was created, collecting voluntary contributions from countries heavily dependent on the strait and using the funds for navigational aids and infrastructure. As of 2023, the fund had raised over $23 million.

International maritime authorities suggest that a similar voluntary fund might be feasible for the Strait of Hormuz, though mandatory fees would challenge long-standing principles supporting free passage in international waterways. Experts also caution that political divisions and security tensions in the Persian Gulf region make a collective governance approach far more complex than the relatively stable framework in Southeast Asia.

“In the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is the threat to navigation,” said one maritime analyst, underscoring the key difference in risk environments. Another expert noted that any successful framework for Hormuz would require agreement among regional players, a difficult prospect given the area’s geopolitical divisions.

While the Strait of Malacca illustrates how maritime cooperation can enhance safety and stability at vital chokepoints, its experience offers only limited guidance for the more volatile and strategically sensitive Strait of Hormuz.