Pakistan’s longstanding military cooperation with Gulf countries has recently taken on a new dimension with the inclusion of nuclear capabilities, raising questions about the future security landscape of the region.
For nearly six decades, Pakistan has maintained a significant military presence in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, dating back to the 1967 defense cooperation agreement signed with Saudi Arabia. Over the years, Pakistani forces have provided training, advisory support, and combat personnel. They participated in the 1969 Al-Wadiah conflict alongside Saudi forces, helped end the 1979 Grand Mosque siege in Makkah, and deployed thousands of troops during the 1991 Gulf War to defend the kingdom. At its height, Pakistan was among the largest suppliers of military manpower in the developing world, rotating up to 15,000 troops through Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. However, this presence had largely diminished by the early 2020s, with fewer than 2,000 personnel reportedly remaining in training and advisory roles.
The strategic relationship evolved notably after two key events last year. In September 2025, an Israeli strike targeted Hamas leadership inside Doha, Qatar—a US treaty ally in the Gulf—sharpening regional security concerns. Shortly after, on September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia formalized a new Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement. This pact expanded in August 2026 to a trilateral agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkiye, stating that an attack on any one member would be considered an attack on all.
The significance of the pact increased further when Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif publicly declared that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capabilities would be made “available” to Saudi Arabia, a statement that Riyadh neither confirmed nor denied. Analysts diverge in their interpretations of the implications. Some, such as Mohammad Salami from the Stimson Centre, argue that the agreement effectively extends a nuclear deterrent to Saudi Arabia. Gulf security analyst Riad Kahwaji has echoed this view, asserting that the pact places Riyadh under a Pakistani nuclear umbrella.
Other experts caution against viewing the pact as a formal nuclear guarantee. Analysts at Harvard’s Belfer Center note that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine remains primarily focused on its rivalry with India and that no evidence suggests a shift in targeting toward Middle Eastern states. Islamabad-based analyst Syed Muhammad Ali contends that Pakistan’s conventional forces suffice to support Saudi security without necessitating nuclear measures. Similarly, the Middle East Institute has urged restraint, emphasizing that the operational complexities of extended nuclear deterrence remain obscure.
The ambiguity surrounding the pact appears intentional. For Saudi Arabia, it signals heightened consequences for potential aggressors without binding Islamabad to explicit commitments. For Pakistan, it reinforces its role as the preeminent Muslim nuclear power while maintaining its established doctrine focused on South Asia. This ambiguity, while manageable between Riyadh and Islamabad, complicates the security calculus for other Gulf states. Turkiye’s inclusion in the pact formalizes its role in regional defense, and Egypt has been mentioned as a possible future member. Notably, Qatar, despite being the target of recent attacks that spurred the new agreements, remains outside the trilateral framework.
As Gulf states navigate this shifting landscape, the central question is whether converting a historical manpower alliance into a security arrangement with purported nuclear components will deter future conflicts or risk escalating the stakes of miscalculation. The evolving pact underscores the need for greater clarity from Islamabad on the scope and limitations of its commitments. Without explicit communication, assumptions based on media statements and think-tank analyses may obscure the true nature of this consequential arrangement, with significant implications for regional stability.