As the United States repositions its aircraft carriers farther from Asia’s coasts, relocating assets to locations such as Guam, a US territory in Micronesia, China is reportedly developing strategies aimed at neutralizing these vessels despite the increased distance. The Pentagon’s shift toward Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) has dispersed carrier strike groups over hundreds of kilometres to enhance survivability, placing high-value aircraft carriers well beyond the range of many conventional missiles. Under this approach, smaller ships and unmanned vessels provide layered defenses ahead of the carriers.

A recent Chinese military analysis outlines a plan intended to penetrate this dispersed formation by exploiting its perceived weakest points. The US defense layers consist of Aegis-equipped destroyers positioned roughly 600 to 800 kilometres in front of carriers, armed with SM-3 interceptors capable of midcourse ballistic missile interception. Closer to the carriers, unmanned surface vessels armed with SM-6 and ESSM missiles form an additional “missile sponge,” supported by air-defense ships, fighter aircraft, and early-warning systems. This dispersal complicates targeting and requires adversaries to overcome multiple, widespread defense rings simultaneously.

China’s proposed tactic begins with a surprise attack launched by submarines firing hypersonic anti-ship missiles aimed at the forward Aegis destroyers. Striking this outer defense layer first is intended to crack the midcourse missile shield, exposing the carrier to subsequent attacks. This approach is described as “breaking the weak node to open a window,” a capability not known to be possessed by other militaries.

Following this initial salvo, the plan envisages a coordinated “firepower package” employing a mix of munitions: inexpensive decoy drones and low-cost cruise missiles to overwhelm sensors and deplete interceptors; stealthy subsonic cruise missiles flying at wave-skimming altitudes to evade radar; and further hypersonic missiles targeting remaining high-value assets. This combination is designed to create a dilemma for US defenses—focusing on one threat type could allow others to penetrate.

An innovative element highlighted is the “leader-follower” tactic within missile swarms, where a leading missile ascends to survey the battlefield and relay targeting data to low-flying missiles. If the leader is destroyed, another missile automatically assumes its role, enabling the swarm to autonomously adapt to electronic jamming and maintain pressure on targets without continuous external commands.

Notably, the Chinese scenario anticipates the US Navy will employ advanced interceptors yet to be fielded, such as glide phase interceptors targeting hypersonic missiles mid-glide, and the SM-6 IB for terminal defense. This assumption, termed liao di cong kuan (“expecting the enemy to be strong”), reflects a strategy constructed to succeed even against the US’s most advanced arsenal.

The analysis also places this military evolution within a broader geopolitical context. It argues that America’s relative decline in industrial capacity and diminishing ability to sustain overseas bases have compelled the adoption of DMO. Conversely, China’s substantial shipbuilding industry and prolific missile production capability support large-scale swarm tactics, potentially overwhelming US defenses through sustained missile salvos.

Publishing such an explicit operational concept is unusual for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the authors of the paper could not be reached for comment. The plan emerges amid ongoing US concerns about China’s expanding military capabilities; last year, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth claimed that China could potentially destroy all American aircraft carriers globally within 20 minutes. If so, the 3,000-kilometre engagement range described in the Chinese analysis may represent only a portion of Beijing’s broader strategic options.