In the seven years since Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2019 call to explore detailed governance proposals for Taiwan after reunification, mainland Chinese scholars have been developing various models outlining how the island might be governed under Beijing’s framework. These academic studies—some finalized by institutions such as Tsinghua University, Xiamen University, and Peking University—are not official government policies but provide insight into Beijing’s evolving strategic considerations regarding Taiwan’s future.
The research emphasizes a flexible approach, with governance scenarios contingent on how reunification is achieved. A prevailing theme is that a peaceful reunification agreement would allow Taiwan significant autonomy under the “one country, two systems” framework, potentially granting it broader powers than those extended to Hong Kong or Macau. Chen Xiancai, director of the Centre for Taiwan Studies at Xiamen University, noted that earlier Taiwanese engagement in negotiations would enhance the island’s leverage to influence reunification terms.
However, if reunification were to occur through what mainland scholars term “compelled reunification”—a strategy involving political, economic, military, and diplomatic pressures short of full-scale conflict—Taiwan's autonomy could be considerably more limited, comparable to or even less than that of the special administrative regions. Chen described “compelled reunification” as a form of pressured peaceful integration, which could include actions such as blockades or intensified military exercises, though not necessarily an outright military invasion.
Recent years have seen an uptick in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military drills around Taiwan, including maneuvers simulating a blockade and operations crossing the Taiwan Strait median line, which has traditionally been an unofficial buffer between the two sides. These activities, alongside diplomatic efforts that have reduced Taiwan’s formal international recognition, suggest Beijing is already applying elements of pressure anticipated in the “compelled reunification” model.
Mainland academics also discussed a recent seminar in Beijing where over 20 scholars, led by Wang Jianmin of Minnan Normal University, agreed on a 12-point proposal that includes maintaining a PLA presence on Taiwan and implementing patriotic education. However, some scholars caution that this does not represent the full spectrum of views within mainland academic circles.
Taiwanese academics have also entered the dialogue. Li Ci-ze of National Changhua University of Education proposed that peaceful reunification could allow Taiwan to retain its current system of direct elections and maintain opposition parties—a suggestion Beijing welcomed without commitment.
Despite these discussions, the “one country, two systems” formula remains deeply unpopular in Taiwan, with polls indicating over 80% opposition. Still, Beijing remains focused on integrating Taiwan through economic and social initiatives, such as infrastructure projects linking the mainland’s Fujian province with Taiwan-controlled islands, aiming to foster closer ties and gradually shift public opinion.
Beijing’s strategy appears to balance incentives with coercion, pursuing increased cross-strait integration while maintaining readiness to apply pressure across various domains. Scholars like Chen argue that despite current challenges, prospects for peaceful reunification persist, especially as Beijing seeks to shape broader international conditions and Sino-American relations favorable to its objectives. Senior Chinese leaders have recently highlighted potential benefits for Taiwan in infrastructure, economic cooperation, energy, and disaster relief upon reunification, underscoring the long-term vision Beijing is promoting alongside its strategic maneuvering.