Since its launch in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved from a conceptual framework into a vast network of infrastructure and investment across Eurasia. While much attention centers on transport projects, China’s growing investments in renewable energy and nuclear power are quietly transforming Central Asia’s energy landscape.

The region, encompassing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is a key node on the BRI’s so-called “New Silk Road.” These countries face pressing energy shortages and environmental challenges, prompting significant interest in clean energy solutions. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for example, have set targets to increase their renewable electricity generation to 15 percent and 50 percent by 2030, respectively. Currently, fossil fuels remain dominant, with coal accounting for nearly half of Kazakhstan’s energy and natural gas comprising almost 80 percent in Uzbekistan.

This energy shift reflects both ecological concerns and the practical demands of reliable service delivery in the region. Blackouts, water shortages, and climate-related disruptions have heightened the urgency for sustainable energy, motivating governments to attract foreign capital. Between 2003 and 2024, China invested approximately $44.4 billion in Central Asia, supporting 175 projects, compared with $50.6 billion invested by the United States through 135 projects during the same period.

Renewable power projects form the core of China’s engagement. Notably, the 100 MW Zhanatas Wind Power Plant in southern Kazakhstan has been operational since 2021, with financing from Chinese institutions alongside international partners like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In Uzbekistan, Chinese firms are advancing several renewable initiatives, including a 500 MW wind farm in Bukhara and a $1.2 billion project in Karakalpakstan. Additionally, Tashkent signed agreements to build a 100 MW energy storage system to bolster grid stability.

China’s influence extends beyond energy generation into clean mobility and aviation. At a recent investment forum in Tashkent, Sinopec Engineering Group secured a $6.1 billion contract to supply sustainable aviation fuel, supporting Uzbekistan’s goal to become a key Eurasian transit hub. Chinese electric vehicles, led by BYD, are gradually eroding the dominance of established brands in Uzbekistan’s automobile market, highlighting a broader green transition.

Underlying these developments is Central Asia’s wealth in critical minerals—manganese, chromium, lead, zinc, titanium, copper, and cobalt—all vital components in batteries, electric vehicles, and turbines. The region holds significant global shares of these resources, making it strategically important for China, which controls much of the world’s rare earth processing capacity and relies on mineral imports from Central Asia. Experts note that geographical proximity and established logistics networks facilitate China’s competitive edge in securing these materials.

Nuclear energy is also central to the region’s power ambitions. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer, supplying 39 percent of global mining output. The International Atomic Energy Agency projects a 15 percent increase in nuclear capacity in Central and Eastern Asia by 2030. Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant is being constructed with Russian technology, while subsequent reactors are planned in partnership with China’s National Nuclear Corporation, reflecting a deepening technical and strategic relationship.

Analysts emphasize that Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states are carefully navigating alliances with major powers, pursuing a “multi-vector” foreign policy to maximize economic and political benefits without becoming overly dependent on any single partner. Engagement with China, in this context, is seen as pragmatic, driven by the urgent need to diversify energy sources and secure long-term infrastructure investments.

Observers suggest China’s growing and sustained presence in Central Asia contrasts with more variable Western engagement tied to political cycles, positioning Beijing as a permanent actor in the region’s evolving energy and economic landscape. If successful, Central Asia’s transition to green energy could offer a model for other developing economies seeking to balance resource development, energy security, and environmental sustainability.