Brazil is unlikely to develop the capacity to produce rare earth magnets from its own raw materials before 2032, according to Andre Luis Pimenta de Faria, coordinator of the country’s main pilot plant operated by Senai, the research and training arm of Brazil’s national industry confederation. This projection suggests that China’s dominant position in the rare earth magnet market will remain largely unchallenged for several years.
Speaking at Exposibram, Brazil’s largest mining congress, Faria stated that while initial batches of magnets might be produced by late 2028, these would still depend on imported, processed inputs rather than domestic raw materials. He emphasized that producing permanent magnets—from mining the ores through to final magnet manufacturing—would require a longer timeframe, potentially extending to 2032–2035.
Faria explained that the pilot plant employs Asian processing technology and imports processed ore to feed its furnaces. He also noted that Brazil, despite being one of the world’s largest exporters of iron ore, does not produce electrolytic iron, a high-purity material essential to magnet production, highlighting a significant gap in the country's processing capabilities.
Pablo Cesario, chief executive of the Brazilian Mining Institute, described the timeline as optimistic. He pointed to an average delay of around 17 years between discovery of a mineral reserve and the onset of production in Brazil and cautioned that, while Brazil works to develop its industry, other nations are advancing their own capabilities concurrently.
The prolonged timeline has strategic implications given the importance of rare earth permanent magnets, which are critical components in electric vehicle motors, wind turbines, industrial robots, and precision weaponry. China currently produces approximately 90 percent of the world’s rare earth permanent magnets and in April 2025 introduced export controls on seven medium and heavy rare earth elements, as well as magnets made from them, affecting supply chains in Europe, the United States, and Asia.
Brazil holds the world’s second-largest rare earth reserves after China and has become a focal point in the global competition for access to these resources. The topic gained political significance during Brazil’s recent presidential campaign. Ronaldo Caiado, governor of the state of Goiás and a presidential candidate, signed a critical minerals memorandum with the United States in March. In response, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva accused Caiado and opposition figures of attempting to “sell Brazil.”
Goiás hosts the Serra Verde mine, which claims to be the only operation outside Asia producing the full set of magnet rare earths at commercial scale. In April, the U.S.-based company USA Rare Earth agreed to acquire Serra Verde for $2.8 billion, a deal that could shift the mine’s output away from Chinese refiners toward American processing facilities.
Despite these developments, Brazil currently refines almost none of the rare earths it mines and lacks a commercial production facility for permanent magnets. Cesario acknowledged that the dominant position of China in processing technology raises questions about whether Brazil should align with Beijing or diversify its partnerships. According to him, Chinese officials expressed openness to cooperation, viewing Brazil as a partner rather than a rival.
Faria described China’s export restrictions as a deliberate government strategy that Brazil must adapt to rather than oppose. These restrictions have prompted global manufacturers to seek suppliers outside China, creating potential opportunities for Brazil, though the country lacks a legal framework to capitalize on this demand.
A draft bill aimed at establishing a national critical minerals policy and a financing fund for mining projects was approved by Brazil’s lower house in May but has stalled in the Senate amid political disagreements between President Lula and Senate President Davi Alcolumbre. The legislature is expected to resume consideration during an upcoming priority voting session.
One point of contention involves the creation of a council attached to the presidency, which would oversee offtake agreements—long-term supply contracts vital for mine financing—and exercise authority over changes in company ownership. Mining industry representatives warn that granting such broad discretion to the executive branch could deter foreign investment and hamper sector growth. Cesario observed that this power could significantly impact Chinese companies, which have acquired stakes in Brazilian lithium and rare earth projects, affecting future supply deals and acquisitions like the Serra Verde transaction.
Meanwhile, officials at Brazil’s foreign ministry express concern over the absence of clear policy direction. Mauricio Lyrio, secretary for climate, energy, and environment, remarked that Brazil faces “almost universal courting” from multiple countries seeking partnerships in rare earth production but lacks a structured framework to evaluate and prioritize those offers.
As Brazil navigates these complexities, its ability to develop an independent rare earth processing and magnet manufacturing industry remains uncertain, with geopolitical, economic, and political factors shaping the trajectory of this strategic sector for years to come.