Since October of last year, Madagascar has seen a significant shift in its political landscape following youth-led protests over shortages of water and electricity that pressured President Andry Rajoelina to flee the country. In the aftermath, a military junta led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina assumed control, receiving substantial support from Russian mercenaries linked to the Russian Africa Corps, a group considered to be the successor to the Wagner mercenary organization.

The Russian presence in Madagascar includes roughly 100 mercenaries who provide security for the junta’s leadership and conduct training for local troops. Alongside personnel, Russia has supplied advisers and weapons to bolster the new regime’s hold on power. This support accompanies a shift in Madagascar’s foreign alignment, as the junta distances itself from traditional French influence—a relationship that had been in place for decades—and increasingly cultivates ties with Moscow.

The move toward Russia has also involved political backing for a pro-Moscow party within Madagascar, raising concerns domestically and internationally about the junta’s priorities. No election timetable has been announced since the military takeover, dimming prospects for a swift return to civilian rule. Analysts describe the current government as deeply wary of internal threats, citing recent claims by Malagasy prosecutors that they disrupted a plot to assassinate Colonel Randrianirina.

Madagascar’s natural resources appear central to Moscow’s growing interest. The island nation possesses significant deposits of minerals such as graphite, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements that are critical for global technology and military supply chains. Situated along the strategically important Mozambique Channel, Madagascar offers Russia a valuable foothold in the Indian Ocean region. Proposals by Moscow include the construction of fuel storage facilities and naval infrastructure that would enhance Russian operational capabilities in the area.

Economic policy changes under the junta have facilitated these developments. Parliament recently transferred control of fuel imports from foreign Western companies to a state-owned enterprise, enabling imports of Russian oil despite ongoing international sanctions. This shift risks triggering further Western penalties against Madagascar.

Historically, Madagascar maintained ties with the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s; however, many Malagasy citizens remain skeptical of the renewed partnership with Russia, viewing it as a potential source of instability. The country’s ongoing political volatility, combined with the influence of entrenched criminal networks, contributes to widespread doubt about the junta’s stability and intentions.

Observers note parallels with Russia’s engagements in other African states, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where Moscow has sought to exploit political uncertainties through similar military and economic arrangements. As Madagascar navigates this complex intersection of domestic unrest and geopolitical competition, questions remain about the future direction of its governance and international relations.