Since Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party took office in 2016, the island has faced increasing diplomatic isolation and heightened military pressure from Beijing. Following Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the Chinese military intensified exercises around the island, with People’s Liberation Army aircraft frequently crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait. Diplomatically, China has succeeded in persuading 10 countries to sever ties with Taipei, further limiting Taiwan’s international space.

The impact of this diplomatic pressure was evident in April, when Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te had to postpone a planned visit to eSwatini, Taiwan’s only diplomatic ally in Africa, after Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar withdrew flight permits for his aircraft along the intended route.

Despite Beijing’s efforts to present the "one country, two systems" framework as a potential model for Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland, public opposition remains strong on the island. An August poll conducted by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council found that over 80 percent of respondents reject the formula.

However, some mainland Chinese scholars maintain that peaceful reunification remains attainable. Chen, a scholar from the mainland, emphasized that Beijing continues to seek integration with Taiwan not only through pressure but also by gradually influencing public opinion. He highlighted factors favoring Beijing, including its growing power and shifting international dynamics, which he said could enhance prospects for reunification.

Chen pointed to the importance of Sino-American relations and Washington’s Taiwan policy as variables Beijing could attempt to influence to improve its reunification environment. After meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in May, then-US President Donald Trump remarked, “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent,” and described a US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan as a negotiation tool, illustrating the complexity of US-Taiwan-China dynamics.

Chen also underscored that Beijing does not rely solely on any specific political party in Taiwan to support reunification. Instead, Beijing aims to engage with pro-reunification groups across the island and use economic and social integration to sway public sentiment over time.

In 2025, Wang Huning, China’s fourth-ranked official responsible for Taiwan affairs, outlined “seven betters”—potential improvements in infrastructure, economy, energy, and disaster relief—that Taiwan could enjoy under reunification. This rare concrete articulation of benefits underscores Beijing’s strategy to highlight tangible advantages for the Taiwanese population.

Beijing has promoted cross-strait integration particularly through pilot projects in the coastal province of Fujian. One significant development nearing completion is the mainland section of a bridge connecting Xiamen with the Taiwan-controlled island of Quemoy (Kinmen). Infrastructure is already in place for the connection to extend fully to Quemoy, symbolizing China’s dual approach of applying pressure while demonstrating economic incentives.

Chen described this strategy metaphorically as akin to courtship, with Beijing taking the initiative to pursue Taiwan through projects and support while maintaining leverage over the island’s authorities. This approach aims both to foster local support and assert influence in the ongoing cross-strait relationship.