China has publicly acknowledged the expansion of its nuclear missile silo infrastructure, a development revealed in a recent state television documentary marking the 99th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The program featured an interview with Cui Daohu, an officer from a PLA Rocket Force engineering unit, who described the construction of missile silos as part of a strategic effort to enhance the country's nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Cui characterized the missile silos as “strategic trump cards,” emphasizing the importance of timely completion to ensure that more weapons positions are operational and combat-ready. He detailed challenges his team faced, including the precise assembly of large, heavy components without damage, suggesting the silos are designed for sophisticated missile systems. While he did not specify the missile types, the descriptions align with silos intended for China’s DF-5 series intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are liquid-fueled and silo-launched.

The latest variant in the series, the DF-5C, was introduced at Beijing’s Victory Day military parade last September and is reported to have a global strike range. Cui stated that the new silo positions are robust, capable of withstanding strikes and supporting retaliatory counterattacks, consistent with China’s declared nuclear doctrine of “no first use” and the pursuit of a reliable second-strike capability.

The documentary also provided insight into the construction timeline. Cui, who has served as a member of the PLA delegation to the National People’s Congress since 2020, mentioned that he was frequently questioned during congressional sessions about the progress of the silo construction. His remarks suggest that the extensive building program has been underway for several years, with a stringent schedule that has been met through the application of new technologies reducing precision assembly times.

Since 2021, satellite imagery analyzed by various governments and think tanks has indicated a significant increase in the number of ICBM silos across China’s northwestern regions, specifically in Hami (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region), Yumen (Gansu Province), and Yulin (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region). The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 China Military Power Report estimated that more than 300 such silos have been constructed across these locations.

China has neither officially confirmed nor denied these figures but has consistently maintained that its nuclear forces are for self-defense and adhere to a no-first-use policy. Chinese officials have pushed back against what they describe as exaggerated portrayals of a “China nuclear threat,” with some state media suggesting that certain identified sites might be wind farms rather than missile facilities.

Cui’s public remarks and the state’s open discussion of the missile silo expansion represent a notable departure from previous reticence and provide a clearer indication of the scope and speed of China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal.