Renewed clashes in Syria’s southern Sweida province have highlighted ongoing challenges to the country’s fragile post-Assad political settlement and the difficulty Damascus faces in asserting control over the Druze-majority region. On Monday, at least 10 members of Syria’s Internal Security Forces were injured in confrontations with local armed groups in western Sweida, according to Syrian state media reports. The violence followed the deaths of two civilians and marks the latest escalation in a conflict that has persisted since the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime in December 2024.
Sweida city and much of the province remain outside the firm grip of Syria’s central authorities. One of the most influential local actors is the National Guard, a Druze-dominated militia led by Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri, a prominent religious figure within the community. The National Guard emerged formally in August 2025, consolidating various armed factions in the province and positioning itself as both protector of local civilians and a parallel security force challenging Damascus’s authority.
The conflict underscores a core issue facing Syria’s new government: how to build a unified state when communities accustomed to self-protection are reluctant to relinquish their arms or accept central control. Experts note that during the later years of the Assad regime, the Druze enjoyed a degree of autonomy, managing local security through militias and checkpoints in an informal arrangement with Damascus.
Sectarian violence that erupted in 2025 between Druze and Bedouin groups intensified the insecurity, drawing in government forces and allied tribal fighters. The clashes resulted in approximately 1,700 deaths and displaced tens of thousands, according to UN agencies and local reports. Many Druze view the violence as confirmation of their vulnerability should they disarm, pointing to historical targeting by radical Islamist groups as a key concern.
Political tensions parallel the security challenges, with Damascus seeking to reintegrate Sweida fully under central governance. Al-Hijri and his National Guard, however, have advocated for greater self-rule, even raising the prospect of an independent Druze entity or a protected status outside Syrian sovereignty. Al-Hijri has notably praised Israel’s state-building model and in August referred to Syria’s Druze as an “integral part of the State of Israel.”
Israel conducted military interventions in the region during the July 2025 violence, including airstrikes against Syrian government forces, stating its aim was to safeguard the Druze population and deter hostile groups near its border. This intervention bolsters Al-Hijri’s argument that external powers can offer security guarantees that Damascus has failed to provide. Conversely, Damascus views Israel’s involvement as a severe threat to Syria’s sovereignty.
Analysts suggest Israel’s actions are partly driven by concerns for its own Druze community and a strategic goal of establishing buffer zones near perceived threats, a policy pattern intensified after the October 7, 2023, attacks. Should Syria respond with force to regain control in Sweida, experts warn the risk of broader confrontation with Israel, potentially escalating into a wider regional conflict.
The situation in Sweida presents a dilemma for Damascus: enforcing authority by military means risks renewed sectarian bloodshed, while tolerating autonomous armed enclaves undermines national sovereignty. Though the province itself may not directly threaten Syria’s territorial integrity, its precedent could inspire other minority groups to seek similar arrangements backed by foreign powers. The conflict’s escalation and possible internationalization remains a significant concern for Syria’s stability and regional security dynamics.