At least 10 members of Syria’s Internal Security Forces were wounded in clashes Monday with armed groups in western Sweida province, Syrian state media reported. The violence followed the deaths of two civilians and underscores ongoing instability in an area that remains largely outside the full control of Syria’s post-Assad government.
Since the fall of Bashar Assad in December 2024, Sweida city and much of the surrounding province have seen limited central government authority. The National Guard, a Druze-dominated militia affiliated with Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri, a prominent religious leader in the Druze community, is among the most powerful forces in the region. The group operates as a parallel security structure, effectively controlling parts of the province.
The conflict in Sweida highlights a broader challenge for Damascus: integrating communities that have long relied on self-defense militias and showing reluctance to relinquish their arms or accept central rule. Analysts point out that Druze militias gained significant autonomy during the late Assad period, operating checkpoints and providing local security under an informal agreement with the regime. When the new government under Prime Minister Ahmad Al-Sharaa assumed power, a degree of semi-autonomy was already established in the province.
Sectarian violence escalated in 2025, culminating in deadly clashes between Druze and Bedouin groups that drew in government forces and allied tribes. According to the United Nations and humanitarian organizations, approximately 1,700 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced during the fighting. For many Druze, the violence reinforced concerns about vulnerability if they were to disarm, given historical targeting by radical Islamist groups.
The National Guard was formally established in August 2025, consolidating most Druze armed factions under Al-Hijri’s de facto leadership. Beyond security, the confrontation involves competing visions for Sweida’s political future. While Damascus seeks to reassert direct control over the province, Al-Hijri has increasingly advocated for self-rule, even suggesting the creation of an independent Druze entity or a protected status outside Syrian sovereignty.
Relations between the Druze leadership in Sweida and Israel add further complexity. In August, Al-Hijri described Syria’s Druze as an "integral part of the State of Israel" and commended Israel’s model of state-building. Israel intervened militarily during the July 2025 violence, carrying out airstrikes against Syrian government positions. Israel stated that its actions were aimed at protecting the Druze population and preventing hostile forces from approaching its border. This intervention reinforced arguments among Al-Hijri’s supporters that external guarantees could offer security absent from Damascus.
From Damascus’s perspective, the apparent ties between Sweida’s Druze and Israel are deeply concerning. Experts suggest Israel’s involvement reflects both concern for its own Druze community and a broader strategy to establish buffer zones along its borders, a pattern seen in other contested areas since the October 2023 attack on Israel.
Al-Hijri has proposed the establishment of a “State of Bashan,” raising the possibility of independence, special autonomy, or alignment with a foreign power. For the Syrian government, imposing authority by force risks reigniting sectarian violence, while tolerating an autonomous armed enclave could weaken central sovereignty. Analysts warn that while Sweida may not directly threaten Syria’s territorial integrity, the precedent it sets could encourage other minorities to seek similar arrangements backed by external powers.
The situation in Sweida remains a potential flashpoint with regional implications. A harsher government response could provoke a larger armed confrontation, potentially drawing Israel into the conflict and escalating tensions between Syria and its neighbor. As such, the fate of Sweida carries outsized significance for Syria’s fragile path toward national unity and stability.