Syrian reactor could have been used for nuclear weapons if completed, UN says

By the Editorial Team · Wednesday, September 9, 2026

The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Syria operated a nearly completed covert nuclear reactor capable of producing weapons-grade fissile material during Bashar al-Assad’s rule. This revelation, following recent inspections, raises concerns about undeclared nuclear activities and emphasizes the need for ongoing monitoring and control to prevent proliferation.

A nearly completed nuclear reactor in Syria, built covertly during Bashar al-Assad’s tenure, had the potential to produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed. Inspectors from the UN nuclear watchdog visited two Syrian sites last month, including one in Deir ez-Zor and another undisclosed location, as part of an inspection following Syria’s notification to the agency.

Rafael Grossi, IAEA Director General, stated on Monday at the agency’s quarterly board meeting in Vienna that it was evident the previous Syrian government had engaged in secret nuclear activities. Grossi described the reactor as “very efficient” at producing fissile material that could be directly used in nuclear weapons, emphasizing the significance of the reactor’s construction as a “very important step” in an undeclared nuclear program.

The existence of the reactor reportedly first came to light in 2007, when Israel conducted an airstrike against the site. U.S. officials later accused Syria of attempting to develop a secret nuclear reactor. Syria formally informed the IAEA of the site’s existence in a letter sent on July 17, inviting the agency to cooperate on inspection and verification efforts.

According to a confidential IAEA report circulated to member states last week, inspectors verified the presence of approximately 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal in the newly disclosed site. The uranium, found in fuel rods with cladding, was hidden in difficult-to-access areas that required inspectors to dismantle walls and navigate narrow passages. Grossi described the site as cluttered with scattered boxes but noted the material is now securely under IAEA safeguards, with cameras installed to monitor it continuously.

When questioned about the future disposition of the nuclear material, Grossi said it would be up to the Syrian government to decide whether to retain or remove it. The agency’s priority remains constant knowledge of the material’s location and status.

Experts underscore that although natural uranium metal itself is not directly usable in weapons, it can be diverted into a covert weapons program by being processed into plutonium. Logan Mintz, director for nuclear materials security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, indicated that if deemed safe for transport, the uranium could be moved under strict security protocols to a third country for conversion into a stable chemical form, typically for peaceful nuclear power purposes.

The unfolding investigation highlights ongoing concerns about clandestine nuclear activities, underscoring the challenges faced by the international community in monitoring and controlling nuclear proliferation in conflict-affected states.

This article was reported by synthesizing coverage from multiple independent news outlets to present a balanced, unbiased account. Read about our editorial standards. Spotted an error? Let us know.