Israel’s opposition leaders have jointly outlined a set of priorities for the government they aim to establish, focusing on four main issues: equitable sharing of national responsibilities, the creation of a state commission of inquiry into the October 7 security failures, the introduction of term limits for prime ministers, and the adoption of a formal constitution. These matters are seen by opposition figures as critical to addressing the country’s ongoing military, social, and political challenges.
The call for equal burden-sharing reflects concerns about Israel’s capacity to sustain its military, economic, and social functions. The demand for a state commission of inquiry seeks to investigate the shortcomings revealed by the recent October 7 events to prevent future failures and honor the sacrifices made. Term limits for prime ministers are advocated to encourage new leadership approaches and reduce the risk of corruption. Lastly, proponents argue that adopting a constitution is essential to establishing a stable legal and social framework for democracy in Israel.
Among these issues, the first three could be addressed relatively quickly through legislation and enjoy broad public backing, according to public opinion surveys. Even some coalition supporters reportedly endorse these positions, though there is debate about the specifics of how burden-sharing should be implemented. In contrast, the call for a constitution, while supported in principle, faces substantial obstacles when it comes to drafting concrete provisions. Israel’s diverse social and identity groups have historically been divided over constitutional questions, contributing to the repeated failure of past attempts to adopt a formal constitution.
Moreover, constitutional changes require wider consensus than ordinary legislation. For a constitution to effectively stabilize governance and endure political shifts, it must be entrenched in a way that prevents easy amendment by temporary majorities. This demands broad public support and high political legitimacy, which is currently lacking given Israel’s pronounced polarization.
The opposition acknowledges the difficulty of achieving consensus on core constitutional elements such as national identity and fundamental rights. Securing agreement on these topics is complicated by deep societal divisions. The current opposition parties may agree internally but lack the necessary public or professional legitimacy to impose entrenched constitutional provisions requiring supermajorities for future amendments.
One proposed alternative is adopting a “thin constitution” focused specifically on institutional arrangements among government branches. This approach would sidestep some identity-based disputes and might garner broader support by establishing clear and fair rules governing the balance of power, which could appeal across political lines. The recent contentious debates over judicial reforms underline the importance and complexity of these institutional questions but suggest potential for compromise.
Such a partial constitutional arrangement, emphasizing procedural and structural reform, could help Israel advance the legal framework needed for political stability and democratic governance. Moving forward, the challenge lies in devising a practical and inclusive path toward constitutional reform that reconciles political realities with the need for durable institutional arrangements.