In recent days, the Houthi movement has solidified its control over key strategic locations in the southern Red Sea, capturing the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands as part of a rapid territorial advance that now places them in effective control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Earlier this month, Houthis seized the port city of Mocha, displacing forces aligned with the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). They also took control of Perim Island, situated within the strait, and the Zuqar islands further north.
The territory gained positions the Iran-supported Shi'ite militants just 20 kilometers from the African coast along the narrowest segment of the southern Red Sea. This control extends their influence over maritime traffic navigating from the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea, granting their broader Iran-led regional alliance enhanced leverage over one of the world’s most critical shipping corridors.
Statements from Houthi representatives emphasize their intent to target Saudi shipping specifically, rather than imposing a general naval blockade on the strait. This tactical focus aligns with recent coordinated actions, including a September 10 drone strike by an Iraqi Shi'ite militia on Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline, a key infrastructure enabling Saudi oil exports to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz — a frequent target of Iranian attacks. The pipeline is expected to remain out of service for several weeks.
The synchronized operations between Iraqi Shi’ite militias and the Houthis illustrate a broad Iran-led regional strategy to extend its control over maritime routes from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea. Targeting Saudi assets directly, rather than engaging in wider disruption of maritime traffic, appears designed to avoid provoking a wider U.S. military response.
While the Houthis share ideological affinities with Iran and receive substantial military support, their autonomy should be noted. Unlike Lebanese or Iraqi Hezbollah, the Houthis are a deeply rooted Yemeni movement with their own local priorities. Their recent military escalation followed Saudi airstrikes against Sana’a airport in July, signaling a targeted campaign mostly against Riyadh interests rather than blind adherence to Iranian command.
Nevertheless, evidence highlights significant Iranian and allied involvement in equipping and directing Houthi forces. Documents obtained from Yemeni sources identify Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese experts embedded with the Houthis, providing critical expertise in intelligence, drone operations, missile development, and security management. Among those named are Iranian specialists such as Haji Murtaza Mokhles and Hassan bin Hasan Danbous, alongside Iraqi experts and senior Houthi officials coordinating these activities on Yemeni soil.
The documents further detail smuggling networks used to import drone components and missile parts, involving key businessmen in Houthi-held territories and shipments from China, with reported backing by Iranian, Russian, and Chinese actors. Notably, several Chinese shipping companies, including COSCO Shipping and Sea Legend Shipping, have reportedly paid the Houthis in hard currency to ensure safe passage through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea maritime lanes.
Communication systems supporting Houthi operations rely on Iranian and Russian technology, with efforts underway to replace disrupted networks using Chinese equipment. Additionally, numerous Iranian-made sensors and surveillance devices are being smuggled into Yemen and assembled locally, supplemented by Chinese thermal cameras imported through official channels.
The current situation underscores an integrated de facto alliance in which the Houthis maintain operational independence while benefiting significantly from Iranian and allied support—a synergy contributing to their recent battlefield successes. This contrasts sharply with the divided anti-Houthi camp, where Saudi operations earlier this year marginalized a capable South Yemeni faction backed by the United Arab Emirates, and subsequent alliances with Turkey and Pakistan have delivered limited military impact.
The United States, while closely monitoring developments, has largely refrained from escalation, citing that Houthi actions are limited to targeting a U.S. ally, Saudi Arabia, and do not threaten wider commercial navigation through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The unfolding developments highlight the depth of coordination behind the Houthis’ advances and the challenges facing their regional opponents. Addressing this complex dynamic will require confronting both the robust support networks sustaining the Houthis and the fragmentation of forces opposing them.
