For much of the past century, the U.S. Supreme Court has been regarded as the definitive interpreter of the Constitution, with its rulings seen as binding on the nation. However, legal scholars Nikolas Bowie and Daphna Renan argue that this prevailing view contradicts the foundational principle that the Constitution was established by “We the People,” not by nine unelected justices.

In a recent analysis marking the 239th anniversary of the Constitution, Bowie and Renan contend that the ultimate authority to interpret constitutional meaning belongs to the American people through their elected representatives, rather than exclusively to the judiciary. They highlight historical episodes when the Supreme Court’s interpretations clashed decisively with Congressional action aimed at protecting fundamental rights.

One notable example is the 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford decision, in which the Court ruled that African Americans could not be citizens and that Congress lacked authority to prohibit slavery in federal territories. This ruling directly opposed abolitionist efforts and prompted vigorous Congressional defiance. Bowie and Renan cite Frederick Douglass’s rejection of the Court’s supremacy, emphasizing that Congress possessed sufficient constitutional power to restrict slavery irrespective of the justices’ interpretations. Subsequently, the Republican-led Congress enacted landmark measures—including the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments—each explicitly empowering Congress to enforce their provisions by legislation.

Despite these constitutional amendments, the Court often struck down Congressional efforts to safeguard rights during Reconstruction and beyond. The scholars note that in recent decades, the Court has dismantled critical protections such as the Voting Rights Act and campaign finance regulations, eliminating limits on political spending and undermining voting rights. These rulings, the authors say, reflect contested interpretations upheld by a narrow majority of lifetime-appointed justices who face no electoral accountability.

Bowie and Renan argue that this judicial dominance risks eroding democratic governance by enabling an unchecked concentration of power. They point out that the Constitution does not explicitly grant the judiciary supremacy in cases where the Court’s interpretation conflicts with statutes adopted by Congress, which represents the popular will. Historically, Congress has exercised its constitutional authority to reshape the judiciary, limit the Court’s jurisdiction, and pass legislation that challenges the Court’s reading—actions that remain viable tools today.

The scholars urge Congress to reclaim this authority by enacting laws that protect voting rights, regulate campaign finance, and impose limits on executive power. They suggest legislative measures could include mechanisms to restrict the Court’s ability to invalidate federal laws, proposals reminiscent of Reconstruction-era efforts that sought to curb judicial overreach. Such steps, they argue, would bolster democratic accountability without diminishing the courts’ role in enforcing federal law and holding individuals accountable.

While some critics worry that weakening judicial review might enable legislative overreach, Bowie and Renan maintain that the Supreme Court itself is influenced by political forces and that the current judicial veto has repeatedly impeded Congress from safeguarding democracy. They emphasize that the solution to questionable laws lies with engaged citizens and elected representatives, not judges acting as the final arbiters of constitutional meaning.

Reclaiming constitutional interpretation by the people through their representatives, they conclude, aligns with the original promise of self-government and would reinforce the rule of law by ensuring that constitutional questions remain subject to democratic debate and modification.