In the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, drug gangs maintain a significant grip on daily life, exemplified by a series of barricades that control movement even near martial arts gyms in neighborhoods such as Penha. Young men, some appearing to be in their mid-teens, stand armed with military-grade rifles, enforcing the gangs’ territorial control. Residents like Thiago Braga, a local gym owner, describe a persistent cycle in which if gang members at checkpoints are removed, they are quickly replaced, highlighting a continual absence of effective state presence.
The influence of armed groups, particularly Comando Vermelho—a dominant gang based in Penha—has grown steadily since the 1980s, paralleling Brazil’s increased role in the global cocaine trade. Research from institutions including Instituto Fogo Cruzado and Fluminense Federal University indicates that about 31% of Rio’s urban area, home to nearly 3 million people or over 40% of the city’s population, lies under the direct or indirect control of gangs. Since 2008, their territorial control has more than doubled, even as Rio served as the host city for major international sporting events.
The issue extends beyond Rio, spreading nationally as Comando Vermelho reportedly operates in 26 of Brazil’s 27 federal units. Its main rival in São Paulo, Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), matches this geographical reach. Both groups are considered by researchers to have membership numbers exceeding those of the more internationally known cartels in Colombia and Mexico. The U.S. government has designated them as foreign terrorist organizations, underscoring concerns about their expanding influence.
The gangs’ reach now extends into political spheres, with prominent figures under investigation or detained amid allegations of collusion. In March, Rodrigo Bacellar, former head of the Rio state legislature, was jailed on charges linked to aiding Comando Vermelho. This infiltration is regarded by experts like Robert Muggah of Instituto Igarapé as a critical and alarming development, characterizing organized crime’s spread from Rio and São Paulo to the wider country as unprecedented.
The growing power of the armed groups and perceived state ineffectiveness in countering them have fuelled the rise of right-wing populist figures. Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro and frontrunner in the upcoming October 25 presidential election, advocates for intensified police action and the construction of high-security prisons for gang members. However, critics argue that this strategy mirrors decades of hardline policies that have failed to stem violence and may exacerbate the situation. Rio already records one of the world’s highest rates of police killings, with more than 11,000 people killed by police in the past decade.
Last year’s police operations in Penha and the nearby Alemão favela resulted in the deaths of over 120 people, marking the deadliest such operation in Brazil’s history. Despite the scale of the raids, gangs like Comando Vermelho have maintained their foothold. Academics such as Carolina Christoph Grillo of Fluminense Federal University argue that more effective prevention and social policies could have curtailed the rise of these groups, and warn that doubling down on militarized policing risks worsening the problem.
Within Rio, armed groups exert extensive control over local populations, enforcing rules from restricting entry to punishing crimes with brutality, often supplanting official institutions. While some schools and clinics operate in these neighborhoods, police presence is largely limited to sporadic, militarized incursions. NGOs and evangelical churches fill aspects of the institutional void. Rafaela França, who runs an NGO in Alemão, notes that in the absence of the state, criminal groups step in to govern everyday life.
This model of criminal governance, once considered unique to Rio due to its geography and isolated communities, has spread nationally. Comando Vermelho’s expansion stretches to the Amazon region and northeast Brazil, where it has established extensive regional networks. A recent poll revealed that around 26% of Brazilians now live under such informal criminal governance, the highest rate in Latin America.
Residents caught in gang conflicts, like Sonia from Fortaleza, recount experiences of violence, intimidation, and lack of police protection. Stigma and economic disadvantage affect those from gang-controlled areas; for example, residents of Penha often face prejudice in employment and broader society.
The upcoming election reflects deep public concern about crime, with many voters endorsing tougher security measures. Bolsonaro has proposed initiatives akin to those seen in other Latin American countries, such as maximum-security prisons modeled on El Salvador’s system and chemical castration for sex offenders. Some local residents support these measures; polls show high approval rates for recent police raids among favela populations.
Conversely, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s campaign emphasizes poverty reduction and social policies as key to addressing violence, though critics suggest his approach has underplayed the urgency of confronting armed groups directly. Lula has expressed regret after comments portraying drug dealers as also victims of the cocaine trade, and his administration has launched federal investigations into gang-related money laundering. His recent campaign messages highlight “protection for workers, prison for criminals.”
Experts caution that incarceration alone may strengthen organized crime, as gangs often recruit and expand through the prison system. University of Chicago researcher Benjamin Lessing contends that simply increasing prison populations will not solve the underlying problems. The police operate in a context of high lethality, with Rio state officials recording daily fatalities far exceeding those in major cities like New York.
Bolsonaro’s own history presents complexities; past associations with Rio’s militia groups—paramilitary organizations formed from former police officers that have evolved into criminal enterprises—raise questions about his ability or willingness to address all facets of the violence. He has denied these connections, yet scrutiny is expected to intensify should he assume the presidency.
Political infiltration by gangs is not limited to criminal suspects; legislative figures in Rio have been arrested for allegedly assisting Comando Vermelho, including arms trafficking and supplying anti-drone equipment. The resulting investigations revealed significant leaks within judicial processes, highlighting the depth of the challenge in disentangling criminal influence from public institutions.
Despite these challenges, some experts point to prior successful attempts to re-establish state control. Ahead of the 2016 Olympics, Rio experimented with permanent police presence in favelas, which reduced violence in targeted areas. Yet economic crises and budget constraints led to the program’s collapse.
The path forward, according to analysts, involves sustained investment in both security and social services, a combination requiring significant time and resources. Residents express skepticism about electoral promises, noting decades of ineffective policies and fearing continued cycles of violence irrespective of the political leadership.
As Brazil approaches a pivotal election, the struggle against entrenched organized crime remains a defining issue shaping the nation’s political landscape and the lives of millions living under the shadow of gangs across the country.