The ongoing conflict in Yemen has placed renewed focus on the Houthi movement, viewed by some analysts as Iran’s remaining significant proxy in the Middle East following a series of setbacks to Tehran-backed groups across the region. While expectations prior to this year’s American and Israeli strikes on Iran had anticipated a rapid weakening or potential collapse of the Iranian regime, the Islamic Republic has so far endured, continuing to exert influence despite increased pressure.

Nonetheless, Iran’s capacity to support its network of regional proxies appears diminished. Groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza have sustained significant losses; Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal has been substantially degraded, and Hamas has lost control of much of Gaza along with numerous fighters. Both organizations, while still capable, are increasingly regarded as reduced to levels of strength comparable to 2002-2006. This shift coincides with considerable advancements in Israeli defense technologies.

Hezbollah’s territorial reach remains limited primarily to parts of Lebanon and is bolstered by support from the Shi’ite minority and allied political factions, including Amal, which often tacitly supports Hezbollah’s activities. However, questions surrounding Amal’s leadership—headed by long-serving Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri—alongside Hezbollah’s weakened status, suggest potential for political change in Lebanon over time.

In Iraq, Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias constitute a formidable force numbering around 100,000 fighters often organized under the Popular Mobilization Forces umbrella. The United States is actively urging the Iraqi government to control these militias, although some factions resist disarmament or state oversight. These groups have demanded a full U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq by the end of September, after which they may reconsider their armament stance. A shift in militia control could significantly impact Iraq’s security landscape.

Amid these regional dynamics, attention has intensified on the Houthis in Yemen. Previously able to receive Iranian weapons and technological support via maritime smuggling, the Houthis now face logistical constraints due to a robust U.S.-led naval blockade that has disrupted arms shipments. This has emboldened Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces allied with Riyadh to pursue renewed offensives against the group.

Military analyst Michael Knights of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy emphasized the Houthis’ vulnerabilities in defending urban and coastal areas but noted their entrenched positions in Yemen’s mountainous regions remain difficult to overcome. According to Knights, Yemeni and international forces have yet to effectively exploit initial gains or mount sustained campaigns to dislodge the Houthis from their core strongholds.

The current offensive against the Houthis raises critical questions about whether coalition forces can capitalize on Iran’s relative isolation and weaken the group’s hold in Yemen. Even if advances stall, the campaign could yield strategic insights into combating Iranian-backed militias.

Iran’s regional influence has notably contracted compared to a decade ago, when figures such as the late IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani were instrumental in coordinating interventions in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Although Iran has not collapsed and continues to conduct missile and drone strikes—reportedly more than 1,000 attacks in Iraq alone—it faces growing difficulties maintaining its proxy network.

The deaths of Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020 marked a significant turning point. Some analysts argue that after years of resource investment, Iranian proxies are showing signs of fatigue, with recovery requiring considerable time. Intensified pressure on these groups could ultimately lead to lasting setbacks for Iran’s regional ambitions.